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Facing One’s Implicit Biases: From Awareness to Acknowledgment 
 
Adam Hahn 
University of Cologne  
Bertram Gawronski 
University of Texas at Austin 
 
Expanding on conflicting theoretical conceptualizations of implicit bias, six studies tested the effectiveness of different 
procedures to increase acknowledgement of harboring biases against minorities. Participants who predicted their responses 
towards pictures of various minority groups on future IATs showed increased alignment between implicit and explicit 
preferences (Studies 1-3), greater levels of explicit bias (Studies 1-3), and increased self-reported acknowledgement of being 
racially biased (Studies 4-6). In all studies, effects of IAT score prediction on acknowledgement were significant even when 
participants did not actually complete IATs, and they were moderated by non-prejudicial goals, in that the degree to which 
IAT score prediction led to acknowledgement increased with stronger non-prejudicial goals, but was diminished for 
participants with weak non-prejudicial goals (Study 4). Mere completion of IATs and feedback on IAT performance had 
inconsistent effects across studies and criterion measures. Instructions to attend to one’s spontaneous affective reactions 
toward minority group members increased acknowledgement of bias to the same extent as IAT score prediction (Study 6). 
The findings are consistent with conceptualizations suggesting that (1) implicit evaluations can be consciously experienced 
as spontaneous affective reactions and (2) directing people’s attention to their spontaneous affective reactions can increase 
acknowledgement of bias. Implications for theoretical conceptualizations of implicit bias and interventions that aim to reduce 
discrimination via increased acknowledgement of bias are discussed.  
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It is often assumed that, in order to counteract 
discrimination, people must acknowledge that they 
harbor intergroup biases such as those reflected in 
implicit evaluations. Performance-based measures such 
as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the Evaluative Priming 
Task (EPT; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), 
and the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, 
Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) revealed that people 
may harbor implicit biases even when they do not show 
explicit biases on traditional self-report measures (e.g., 
Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Many researchers 
and policy makers have responded to these findings with 
initiatives to educate the public about implicit biases, 
assuming that acknowledgement of these biases is an 
important step in counteracting discrimination. In line 
with this idea, acknowledgement of bias plays a central 
role in theories of prejudice reduction (e.g., Monteith & 
Mark, 2005) and may have contributed to efforts to make 
implicit bias tests widely accessible through online tools 
(e.g., http://implicit.harvard.edu). The popular media are 
similarly replete with anecdotal reports of the positive 
effects of learning about one’s implicit biases (e.g., 
“Dateline NBC”, 2007; “This American Life”, 2015) and 
calls to make implicit bias testing mandatory for certain 
professions (e.g., Reuters, 2016). In fact, then-
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton announced she 
would dedicate funds to implicit bias training for police 
officers and other professions if she won the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential Election (Hillaryclinton.com, 2016). 
However, despite the central role commonly attributed 
to acknowledgement of bias, the factors that lead to such 
acknowledgement are still not well understood. 
Moreover, different theoretical conceptions of implicit 
bias suggest different interventions to increase 
acknowledgement of bias, but scientific consensus about 
the validity of these conceptions is still lacking. 
Expanding on conflicting conceptions of implicit 
bias, the current research investigated the effectiveness 
of different procedures to increase acknowledgement of 
personal bias. Toward this end, we tested the extent to 
which acknowledgement of bias is increased by 
predicting one’s IAT scores (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 
2014) and compared the obtained effects to those 
resulting from actual IAT completion and feedback 
about one’s IAT performance.  
Theories of Implicit Evaluation and 
Acknowledgement of Bias 
Implicit evaluations are often assumed to reflect 
attitudes and beliefs people are either unable or unwilling 
to report (e.g., https://implicit.harvard.edu/ 
implicit/education.html, retrieved on April 10, 2018). 
Although the two conceptions are frequently mentioned 
within the same sentence, they suggest different ways to 
increase acknowledgement of bias.  
The idea that people are unable to report their 
implicit biases is captured by the notion that implicit 
evaluations reflect unconscious attitudes to which people 
have no introspective access (for a critical review, see 
Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006; Hahn & 
Gawronski, 2014; Hahn et al., 2014). Based on 
Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) definition of implicit 
attitudes as “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately 
identified) traces of past experience that mediate 
favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action 
toward social objects” (p. 8), some researchers argue that 
people have no introspective access to their implicit 
biases, which makes them unable to report these biases 
on traditional self-report measures. From this 
perspective, one potential way to increase 
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acknowledgement of bias is to inform people about their 
implicit biases by providing individual feedback on their 
measurement scores. For example, after completing an 
IAT on the Project Implicit webpage 
(http://implicit.harvard.edu), participants typically 
receive feedback on their personal level of bias, which is 
derived from of numeric cut-offs that translate a 
participant’s IAT score into verbal feedback (e.g., a D-
score of 0.2 on the race IAT reflecting a slight automatic 
preference for White over Black). Applied to the current 
question, such feedback may increase acknowledgement 
of bias by informing participants about their unconscious 
attitudes, which they are unable to know without 
feedback on their personal measurement scores.  
The idea that people are unwilling to report their 
implicit biases is captured by the notion that 
dissociations between implicit and explicit evaluations 
reflect self-presentational distortions on self-report 
measures (for a critical review, see Gawronski, LeBel, & 
Peters, 2007). Because responses on traditional self-
report measures are much easier to control than 
responses on performance-based measures, honest 
reporting of one’s biases on self-report measures can be 
undermined by social desirability and other self-
presentational concerns (Dunton, & Fazio, 1997). From 
this perspective, one potential way to increase 
acknowledgement of bias is to create contexts that 
encourage participants to openly admit to their biases. 
One of those instances may be to tell participants that 
their personal biases will be identified with a 
performance-based measure that cannot be controlled 
(e.g., Nier, 2005). The idea behind such measures is that 
announcement of a test should make continuous 
intentional misreporting futile. Applied to the current 
question, knowledge that one’s biases will be uncovered 
by a psychological test may increase people’s 
willingness to admit to their personal biases, and this 
increase may occur without individual feedback on one’s 
measurement scores from a bias test.  
A third perspective assumes that people have no 
introspective access to the attitudes underlying implicit 
biases, but people can become aware of these attitudes 
by observing their behavioral effects (Hofmann, 
Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2009; Hofmann & Wilson, 
2010). Although performance-based measures differ in 
the extent to which participants become aware of 
systematic differences in their behavioral responses 
(Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009), participants completing 
the IAT often notice the difference in their reaction times 
and errors in the prejudice-congruent and prejudice-
incongruent blocks (Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 
2001). In line with notions of self-perception (Bem, 
1972) this perspective suggests that mere completion of 
an IAT even without feedback about one’s measurement 
scores may increase acknowledgement of bias to the 
extent that participants notice the behavioral effects of 
their attitudes in the task.  
A fourth conception suggests that implicit 
evaluations are subjectively experienced as spontaneous 
affective reactions, and dissociations between implicit 
and explicit evaluations arise from differences in the 
extent to which people rely on their spontaneous 
affective reactions in making an evaluative judgment 
(Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). 
To the extent that people accept their spontaneous 
affective reactions as a basis for evaluative judgments, 
implicit and explicit evaluations are assumed to align. In 
contrast, if people reject their spontaneous affective 
reactions, implicit and explicit evaluations should 
dissociate. Thus, to the extent that people reject their 
spontaneous affective reactions toward minority 
members as a basis for overt judgments, they may 
dismiss the significance of these reactions in producing 
discriminatory behavior. From this perspective, directing 
people’s attention to their spontaneous affective 
reactions toward minority members may increase 
acknowledgement of bias by counteracting the dismissal 
of these reactions. Different from the previous three 
conceptions, this view suggests that acknowledgement 
of bias could be increased by directing people’s attention 
to their spontaneous affective reactions without 
requiring them to complete an IAT, without feedback on 
their measurement scores, and without anticipation of 
actual measurement.  
In the current research, we tested the effectiveness 
of these theoretically derived procedures in increasing 
acknowledgement of bias, focusing particularly on the 
prediction of one’s IAT scores as a procedure to enhance 
attention to one’s spontaneous affective reactions (see 
Hahn et al., 2014). Toward this end, participants 
predicted their IAT scores or not, completed IATs or not, 
and received feedback on their IAT performance or not. 
In addition, we compared effects of IAT score prediction 
to the effects of merely attending to one’s spontaneous 
affective reactions toward minority groups. The 
overarching goal was to shed light on which of these 
strategies would increase acknowledgement of bias as 
reflected in (1) greater alignment between implicit and 
explicit preferences, (2) greater levels of explicit bias, 
and (3) greater self-reported acknowledgement of being 
biased. 
IAT Completion and Acknowledgement of Bias 
Previous research on whether IAT feedback leads 
people to acknowledge their biases has revealed mixed 
evidence. Analyzing over 100,000 responses to IAT 
feedback on the IAT website, Howell and colleagues 
(Howell, Gaither, & Ratliff, 2015; Howell & Ratliff, 
2017) concluded that participants tend to react 
defensively when their feedback deviates from their 
performance expectations. Participants whose IAT 
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feedback suggested more bias than they had ascribed to 
themselves were more likely to question the validity of 
the IAT than participants whose IAT feedback 
confirmed their contentions. These findings suggest that 
participants who could learn the most from their 
feedback are the ones who are most likely to reject it; 
only participants who receive confirmatory feedback 
seem to accept it. Echoing this concern, other research 
has shown that a substantial number of people attribute 
their performance on the IAT to factors other than 
personal bias (e.g., Casad, Flores, & Didway, 2013; 
Monteith et al., 2001; Uhlmann & Nosek, 2012). A 
potential explanation for these attributions is that 
completing racial IATs can be a threatening experience 
for White participants, particularly when these IATs are 
described as diagnostic measures of racism (Frantz, 
Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004).  
Deviating from the approach of the IAT website 
where participants receive feedback on completed IATs, 
Monteith et al. (2001) tested whether participants notice 
their performance differences on different blocks of the 
IAT. In their study, 64% did noticed such differences, 
but only 37% of these participants attributed them to 
race-related factors as opposed to race-unrelated factors 
(e.g., block order, color associations). Participants who 
noticed their performance differences and attributed 
them to racial bias tended to experience negative affect, 
which the authors viewed as an important step in 
enhancing the motivation to control prejudiced reactions. 
These findings demonstrate that recognizing bias from 
IAT completion is possible and may have downstream 
effects on self-perception. However, these effects seem 
to be limited to a relatively small proportion of 
participants.  
Research adopting a “bogus pipeline” approach 
(Nier, 2005) found higher correlations between IAT 
scores and the Modern Racism Scale (MRS, 
McConahay, 1986) when participants were told that (1) 
the IAT is a valid measure of racial attitudes akin to a 
“lie detector” and (2) they should complete the MRS as 
if the computer on which they had completed the IAT 
predicted their responses. Correlations between the IAT 
and the MRS were relatively low when participants 
completed the IAT without this information or with 
information questioning the validity of the IAT. These 
results are consistent with the idea that anticipating 
identification of one’s biases with a psychological test 
may increase people’s willingness to admit their 
personal biases. However, one may question whether 
instructions to complete a self-report measure “like the 
computer would” is equivalent to acknowledgement of 
harboring racial biases. 
Research on classroom use of the IAT (Casad et al., 
2013; Hillard, Ryan, & Gervais, 2013), as well as 
anecdotal evidence from bias awareness trainings (e.g., 
“Dateline NBC”, 2007; “This American Life”, 2015) 
generally report positive effects of completing IAT 
measures of implicit bias and discussing their outcomes. 
However, all of these studies lacked suitable control 
conditions or explicit bias measures prior to completing 
the IAT. Hence, it remains unclear whether high 
correlations between IAT scores and post-IAT measures 
of explicit bias (which may reflect “acknowledgement of 
bias”) are the result of completing IATs (Hillard et al., 
2013). Similarly, findings that participants experience 
more positive than negative affect after an IAT class 
exercise (Hillard et al., 2013) are difficult to interpret 
when there is no control condition to assess participants’ 
baseline affect. After all, most people feel more positive 
than negative affect most of the time (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). Even if one were to accept the 
conclusion that these classroom and awareness exercises 
lead to increased acknowledgement of bias, it would 
remain unclear if the obtained effects are caused by the 
completion of IATs or by other aspects of the exercises, 
such as reflection about one’s personal biases. 
IAT Score Prediction and Acknowledgement of Bias 
Counter to the widespread assumption that implicit 
biases reflect unconscious attitudes, Hahn et al. (2014) 
found that people can predict their patterns of scores on 
prejudice IATs with a high degree of accuracy. This 
result differs from findings by Howell and colleagues 
(Howell et al., 2015; Howell & Ratliff, 2017) showing 
that people chose less negative labels to describe their 
biases than the feedback they received on the IAT 
website and responded defensively to negative feedback. 
Although people may not believe that their bias for one 
group over another is “very strong” (and react 
defensively if a computer program tells them so), they 
may still be able to identify with a high degree of 
accuracy whether they show more bias against some 
groups than others (see Hahn et al., 2014, for a more 
detailed discussion on this difference). Interestingly, 
participants who accurately predicted the patterns of 
their IAT scores and then completed those IATs later 
showed (1) greater explicit preferences for Whites over 
minorities and (2) greater alignment between explicit 
and implicit preferences. Together, these findings 
suggest that predicting one’s IAT scores may be more 
effective in increasing acknowledgement of bias than 
actual IAT completion and IAT feedback. However, at 
least two points make this conclusion premature. First, 
Hahn et al.’s (2014) findings do not address the question 
of whether the obtained changes in explicit bias are 
caused by the prediction of IAT scores, actual IAT 
completion, or a combination of the two. Second, it 
remains unclear whether greater explicit preference for 
Whites over minorities and greater alignment of explicit 
and implicit preferences reflects genuine 
acknowledgement of bias. The purpose of the current 
research is to shed light on these questions. Below we 
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elaborate on each question before we present the two 
approaches with which we addressed them. 
IAT Completion vs. IAT Score Prediction  
Hahn et al.’s (2014) finding that people can predict 
their IAT scores with a high degree of accuracy poses a 
challenge to the idea that implicit biases reflect 
unconscious attitudes that people are unable to report. 
Nevertheless, the obtained increase in explicit biases and 
the increased alignment between implicit and explicit 
preferences are compatible with three of the ideas 
mentioned above on how to increase acknowledgement 
of bias. First, because participants were told that that 
they would have to complete the IATs for which they 
were asked to make predictions, the obtained effects are 
consistent with the hypothesis that acknowledgement of 
bias can be increased by creating a context that 
encourages participants to openly admit to their biases. 
According to this view, anticipating that one’s biases 
will be uncovered by a psychological test may increase 
people’s willingness to admit to their personal biases, 
and this increase may occur without actual completion of 
an implicit bias test or individual feedback on one’s 
measurement scores. Second, because participants 
actually completed IATs, the obtained effects are 
consistent with the hypothesis that people may become 
aware of their unconscious attitudes by observing 
behavioral effects of these attitudes while completing 
IATs. Finally, because participants were asked to predict 
their IAT scores, the obtained effects are consistent with 
the hypothesis that directing people’s attention to their 
spontaneous affective reactions may increase 
acknowledgement of bias by counteracting the dismissal 
of these reactions. According to this view, the prediction 
task may direct people’s attention to their spontaneous 
affective reactions, which should increase 
acknowledgement of bias without actual completion an 
IAT, and without anticipation of actual measurement. 
Based on these considerations, the obtained increase in 
explicit biases and the increased alignment between 
implicit and explicit preferences could be the result of 
any of the three mechanisms (or any of their 
combinations).  
Acknowledgement of Bias?  
Another important question is whether the obtained 
increase in explicit biases and greater alignment between 
implicit and explicit preferences reflect increased 
acknowledgement of bias. In Hahn et al.’s (2014) 
studies, participants reported greater negativity towards 
                                                 
1 In the literature on implicit bias, the term awareness is often used to 
refer to people’s conscious access to the attitudinal representations that 
presumably underlie their implicit evaluations (Hahn et al., 2014; Hahn 
& Gawronski, 2014). This interpretation is different from the one in 
Monteith and colleagues’ work (e.g., Monteith et al., 1993; 2001; 
Monteith & Mark, 2005), which is concerned with people’s awareness 
Latinos, Asians, and Black people (compared to White 
people) after predicting their IAT scores and completing 
IATs with performance feedback. One potential 
interpretation of these findings is that participants simply 
became less concerned about openly expressing their 
thoughts and feelings about minority members, but they 
may not necessarily think of these openly expressed 
judgments as being biased. A different interpretation can 
be derived from research inspired by Monteith and 
Mark’s (2005) theory of prejudice reduction. In a series 
of studies by Monteith and colleagues (e.g., Czopp, 
Monteith, & Mark, 2006; Monteith, Devine, & 
Zuwerink, 1993; Monteith et al., 2001), participants 
showed enhanced negative self-related affect and 
increased motivation to control prejudiced behavior 
when they were confronted with feelings, thoughts, or 
behaviors that were more prejudiced than their personal 
standards would permit. From this perspective, the 
obtained increase in explicit biases and increased 
alignment between implicit and explicit preferences may 
reflect increased acknowledgement of bias in the sense 
that participants noticed a level of bias that conflicts with 
their personal standards.1 However, in the absence of 
additional evidence, any such interpretation may be 
deemed premature. Thus, to provide more compelling 
evidence for the proposed interpretation in terms of 
acknowledgement of bias, we conducted two sets of 
studies with different criterion measures. The first set of 
studies investigated changes in the size of explicit biases 
and their alignment with implicit biases; the second set 
of studies measured acknowledgement of bias more 
directly by asking participants to rate the extent to which 
they harbor racial biases.  
The Present Research 
In Studies 1-3, we tested whether predicting one’s 
IAT scores and completing IATs without feedback 
(Studies 1-3) and with feedback (Study 3) influences 
explicit preferences for Whites over racial minorities. 
Using a pre-post repeated measures design, we tested 
whether participants would change their explicit 
preferences from before to after our experimental 
manipulations such that they show (1) greater alignment 
between their explicit and implicit preferences, and (2) 
greater explicit preference for White people over racial 
minorities. 
To disambiguate the meaning of the obtained effects 
on explicit biases, participants in Studies 4-6 were 
directly asked to assess their level of racial bias. In these 
that they are more prejudiced than their personal standards would 
permit. Although the current research builds on several ideas by 
Monteith and colleagues, we use the term acknowledgement of bias in 
the current paper to avoid potential confusion between the two 
meanings of the term awareness.  
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studies, participants predicted and/or completed a Black-
White IAT without feedback (Studies 4 and 5) or with 
feedback (Study 5) and then rated the extent to which 
they harbor racial biases. Study 4 additionally 
investigated whether the obtained effects are moderated 
by the degree to which participants hold non-prejudicial 
goals. Study 6 compared the effects of IAT score 
prediction to the effects of enhanced attention to on one’s 
spontaneous affective reactions toward Black and White 
individuals. For all studies reported here, the data were 
collected in one shot without prior statistical analyses. 
We report all data exclusions, all measures, and all 
manipulations. All materials, data, and analysis files are 
available at osf.io/mkc9r.  
Study 1 
Expanding on the procedures by Hahn et al. (2014), 
participants in Study 1 provided feeling thermometer 
ratings of Asians, Blacks, Latinos/Hispanics, and 
Whites, celebrities and regular people, as well as 
children and adults at two time points. Between those 
two times of measurement, we implemented two 
experimental manipulations. First, after completing the 
first set of thermometer ratings, half of the participants 
predicted how they would score on a psychological test 
designed to measure their “implicit attitudes” towards 
the same groups; the other half did not make any such 
predictions. Second and orthogonal to the prediction 
manipulation, half of the participants completed the 
corresponding IATs (without feedback), whereas the 
other half completed the IATs after later in the study (see 
Figure 1). Afterwards, all participants completed the 
same feeling thermometer ratings a second time. Finally, 
participants completed a set of exploratory measures 
reported in Supplemental Materials Section A. The main 
question was whether IAT score prediction or actual IAT 
completion (or both) increase explicit biases and their 
relation to implicit biases. Although we were primarily 
interested in bias against minority groups, we included 
the children-adult and celebrity-regular comparisons to 
have sufficient variance in each participant’s IAT scores 
to investigate within-subject relations of these scores 
with participants’ prediction scores (to replicate the 
findings by Hahn et al., 2014). 
Method 
Participants and design. One-hundred-and-fifty-
seven undergraduate students from a large Canadian 
university participated in Study 1 for course credit or 
payment of $10 CAD. Seven participants responded 
within less than 300 ms to more than 10% of trials on 
one or more of the IATs. In line with recommendations 
by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003), these 
participants were excluded from analyses. Of the 
remaining 150 participants (65.3% female, median age = 
20 years, age range = 18-66 years), 38.7% identified as 
White, 35.3% as East-Asian, 6.7% as South-Asian, 5.3% 
as Middle-Eastern, 2.7% as Black, and 1.7% as Latino. 
The remaining 10% identified as “other,” reporting 
either a mix of several or a different ethnic background 
from those mentioned above.  
To investigate whether participants would change 
their explicit evaluations to be more in line with the 
patterns of their implicit evaluations, we employed a 
multi-level design in which participants were presented 
with five pairs of social groups. This multi-level design 
was adapted from Hahn et al. (2014) with the exception 
that we manipulated whether participants (1) predicted 
their IAT scores and (2) completed IATs before they 
provided their second explicit ratings of the groups (see 
Figure 1). Thus, in addition to the continuous multi-level 
aspect of the design (which we explain in more detail 
below), the study consisted of a 2 (Time of Feeling 
Thermometer Ratings: Time-1 vs. Time-2) × 2 (IAT 
Score Prediction: prediction vs. no prediction) × 2 (IAT 
Completion: completed vs. not completed) mixed 
design, with the first variable being a within-subjects 
factor and the other two being between-subjects factors. 
Measures and materials. Explicit evaluations were 
measured with feeling thermometer scales. Participants 
were asked to indicate their feelings towards eight 
groups on scales ranging from 0 (unfavorable and cool 
feelings) to 100 (favorable and warm feelings). The 
feeling thermometer items were presented in three 
blocks: (1) Asians, Blacks, Latinos/Hispanics, and 
Whites, presented in individually randomized orders, (2) 
children and adults, and (3) celebrities and regular 
people (non-celebrities). The presentation order of the 
three blocks was randomized for each participant. At 
Time-2, after completing the experimental procedures in 
the different conditions, participants were asked to rate 
your feelings towards the social groups one more time, 
using the feeling thermometer again. 
Participants in the prediction condition were 
presented with the following instructions: 
Knowing Your Implicit Attitude: In this study, we are 
interested in divergences that might occur between 
people’s IMPLICIT and their EXPLICIT attitudes. For 
this purpose, this study uses a method called the 
“IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST”, or IAT for short. In 
a minute, you will complete some IATs and we are 
interested in whether you can predict your performance 
on each one. That is, we are interested in whether YOU 
KNOW your IMPLICIT attitude. 
On the next slide, participants were told that they 
would be asked to complete a BLACK-WHITE IAT, a 
LATINO-WHITE IAT, an ASIAN-WHITE IAT, a 
CHILD-ADULT IAT, and a CELEBRITY-REGULAR 
PERSON IAT. Participants then proceeded to making 
predictions for each IAT, one at a time in individually 
randomized orders. The prediction slides showed the ten 
pictures for each group that were used as target stimuli 
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in the IATs and a short text that referred to the depicted 
individuals as representing the two social categories in 
question. Below this text, a sentence read I predict that 
the IAT comparing my reactions to 
[ASIAN/BLACK/LATINO/CHILD/CELEBRITY, 
respectively] vs. [WHITE/ADULT/REGULAR, 
respectively] will show that my implicit attitude is… and 
participants were asked to indicate their response on 11-
point scales ranging from -5 (a lot more positive towards 
ASIAN/BLACK/LATINO/CHILD/CELEBRITY) to 5 (a 
lot more positive towards WHITE/ADULT/REGULAR). 
Participants in the no-prediction condition 
completed a filler task titled “Consumer Preferences.” 
These participants were asked to indicate their 
preferences regarding 5 types of consumer goods (i.e., 
foods, cellphone vs. landline, types of movies, leisure 
time activities, and formal vs. casual clothing) using 
scales that were similar to the ones in the prediction 
condition, but without reference to social groups or 
IATs.  
Participants completed the same five IATs 
described in Hahn et al. (2014), which are shorter than 
conventional IATs to avoid fatigue. Before beginning 
with the actual IATs, participants completed a 20-trial 
positive and negative word-sorting task. They then 
completed the five shortened IATs in individually 
randomized orders without repeating the word sorting 
block (positive and negative words were sorted with the 
same key assignments in all combined blocks of all 
IATs). The IATs were introduced with the following two 
sentences: You will now complete a group of tasks known 
as the ‘IAT’. These tasks involve CATEGORY 
JUDGMENTS. The introduction of the IATs was 
followed by procedural information about the task and 
keys involved. Each IAT consisted of four blocks: (1) a 
20-trial practice block in which participants were asked 
to categorized faces as WHITE, ADULT, or REGULAR 
using a right-hand key and BLACK, ASIAN, LATINO, 
CHILD, or CELEBRITY using a left-hand key; (2) a 40-
trial compatible dual-categorization block in which 
WHITE, ADULT, or REGULAR were grouped with 
positive words and BLACK, ASIAN, LATINO, CHILD, 
or CELEBRITY were grouped with negative words; (3) 
another 40-trial practice block where the pictures had to 
be categorized with a reversed key assignment; and (4) a 
40-trial incompatible dual-categorization block in which 
BLACK, ASIAN, LATINO, CHILD, or CELEBRITY 
were grouped with positive words and WHITE, ADULT, 
or REGULAR were grouped with negative words. IAT 
scores were computed by comparing the average 
response latencies of Blocks 4 and 2 divided by their 
pooled standard deviation (see Greenwald et al., 2003). 
                                                 
2 Cronbach’s α values were calculated by computing four separate IAT 
D-scores for the first, second, third, and fourth sets of 10 trials of the 
Thus, higher scores reflect greater bias in favor of 
WHITE, ADULT, or REGULAR compared to the 
respective contrast categories. 
Each group was represented by photographs of five 
male and five female faces with neutral expressions, 
presented with hair and neck against grey backgrounds. 
The pictures were adapted from Hahn et al. (2014), who 
used images from the Productive Aging Lab website 
(Minear & Park, 2004) and images that were publicly 
available online. The ten pictures used to represent the 
category WHITE were different in each of the IATs. 
Participants did not receive any feedback on their IAT 
scores in this study. Despite the lower number of trials 
compared to standard IATs, all five IATs showed 
satisfactory reliabilities (Cronbach’s α values for 
BLACK-WHITE = .73, ASIAN-WHITE = .73, 
LATINO-WHITE = .72, CHILD-ADULT = .64, 
CELEBRITY-REGULAR = .68).2 
Procedure. The procedure of Study 1 is depicted 
graphically in Figure 1. After providing informed 
consent, participants started the study by completing the 
Time-1 thermometer ratings. Afterwards, participants in 
the prediction condition predicted their IAT scores as 
described above, whereas participants in the no-
prediction condition completed the filler task. Next, 
participants in the completion condition completed the 
five IATs and then provided their Time-2 thermometer 
ratings; participants in the no-completion condition 
provided their Time-2 thermometer ratings and then 
completed the five IATs. The Time-2 thermometer 
ratings were the same in all conditions and did not refer 
to the predictions or the IATs. The prediction task 
emphasized that an IAT score reflects a separate 
construct from a “feeling” towards a group of people 
captured by an explicit thermometer rating (see above). 
The five IATs were presented in orders individually 
randomized for each participant. After all participants 
had completed the IATs and the Time-2 thermometer 
ratings, they completed a set of exploratory measures 
described in Supplemental Materials Section A. The 
study concluded with demographic questions and an 
opportunity for participants to provide feedback, after 
which they were debriefed and compensated for their 
participation.  
Results 
Prediction accuracy. Although not the primary 
question of this study, we first investigated the degree of 
prediction accuracy among the 75 participants who 
predicted their IAT scores. Toward this end, we 
regressed person-standardized IAT scores onto each 
participant’s person-standardized predictions on Level 1 
compatible and incompatible blocks, respectively (S. Teige-
Mocigemba, personal communication, Oct. 2017). 
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of a multi-level analysis, and then tested the fixed effects 
of the resulting slopes on Level 2 across participants (see 
Hahn et al., 2014, for a more detailed account of the 
rationale behind this within-subject assessment of 
accuracy). This fixed effect slope is equivalent to an 
average within-subject correlation between prediction 
scores and IAT scores for each participant, indicating 
how accurately participants predicted the patterns of 
their IAT scores on average. The size of this slope was b 
= .48, SE = .046, t(373) = 10.38, p < .001. Computing 
correlations separately for each participant revealed a 
skewed distribution with the same mean as the multi-
level analysis, and a median correlation of r = .54. Both 
of these values are slightly lower compared to the ones 
reported in Hahn et al. (2014), who found a mean 
correlation of r = .54 and a median correlation of r = .68 
across studies. Nevertheless, the current results still 
indicate a substantial degree of accuracy in the prediction 
of IAT scores, replicating the findings by Hahn et al. 
(2014).  
IAT scores. To investigate whether IAT scores 
were affected by our experimental manipulations, we 
conducted five separate 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 
(IAT Completion) ANOVAs, one for each of the five 
IATs. There were no significant differences in implicit 
bias levels across conditions on any of the five IATs, all 
Fs < 2.40, all ps > .12. To investigate if the prediction 
task influenced the rank order of implicit bias scores for 
the different target groups (e.g., as a result of participants 
trying to produce IAT scores that are congruent with 
their predicted scores), we averaged the scores of each of 
the five IATs separately within the predictions and the 
no-predictions conditions and calculated the correlation 
between these average scores on the five IATs in the two 
conditions. This correlation was r = .99, indicating that 
participants who predicted their IAT scores produced 
virtually identical patterns of implicit bias as participants 
who did not predict their scores. Thus, there was no 
evidence that the prediction task affected IAT scores. 
Alignment of explicit and implicit biases. Our 
main question was whether predicting IAT scores or 
actual IAT completion (or both) would lead participants 
to incorporate their implicit preferences to a greater 
extent into their explicit preferences. In terms of the 
current design, enhanced incorporation of implicit 
preferences into explicit preferences is reflected in a 
change in the relation between implicit and explicit 
preference scores from Time-1 to Time-2, such that 
explicit preference scores become more in line with the 
patterns of IAT scores (see Hahn et al., 2014). Causal 
effects of IAT score prediction and IAT completion 
would be reflected in significant interaction effects, such 
that the predicted increase in the relation between 
implicit and explicit preference scores depends on either 
of the two experimental factors (or both).  
To test these effects, we computed five difference 
scores from the thermometer ratings reflecting relative 
preferences for the respective groups at Time-1 and 
Time-2, equivalent to those captured by the five IATs: 
preference for Whites over Asians, preference for Whites 
over Blacks, preference for Whites over Latinos, 
preference for adults over children, and preference for 
celebrities over regular people. We then simultaneously 
regressed person-standardized values of each 
participant’s thermometer preference scores at Time-2 
onto their person-standardized thermometer preference 
scores at Time-1 and their IAT scores for each 
participant on Level 1 of our multi-level analysis. The 
slope of the Time-1 thermometer preference scores 
captures the degree to which the patterns of explicit 
preferences remained stable from Time-1 to Time-2. The 
slope of the IAT scores captures changes in the pattern 
of explicit preferences from Time-1 to Time-2 that can 
be explained by participants’ IAT scores (i.e., the 
average additional variance per participant in Time-2 
thermometer preference score patterns that is shared with 
IAT scores over and above Time-1 thermometer 
preference scores). A significant effect for the latter 
slope would indicate a change in the observed patterns 
of explicit preferences in the sense that they become 
more in line with the observed patterns of implicit 
preferences at Time-2 compared with Time-1. To 
investigate whether this effect depends on the prediction 
of IAT scores and/or actual completion of IATs, we then 
tested whether the predicted slope for IAT scores at 
Level 1 is moderated by IAT Score Prediction and IAT 
Completion at Level 2 in a 2 × 2 design. Toward this end, 
we included one contrast code for the IAT Score 
Prediction factor (coded -1 for the no-prediction 
condition and 1 for the prediction condition), one 
contrast code for the IAT Completion factor (coded -1 
for IATs not yet completed and 1 for IATs completed), 
and one contrast code for their interaction (i.e., the 
product of the two contrasts). We then tested whether the 
Level-1 effects of IAT scores and Time-1 thermometer 
preferences interacted with the three Level-2 contrasts.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1. 
A significant main effect of Time-1 thermometer 
preferences, b = .73, SE = .030, t(143.84) = 24.18, p < 
.001, indicated a substantial degree of consistency in 
explicit preferences over time. There was also a 
significant main effect of IAT scores over and above 
Time-1 thermometer preferences, b = .15, SE = .026, 
t(149.67) = 5.59, p < .001, supporting the predicted 
adaptation of explicit preferences to implicit preferences. 
Both of these effects interacted with IAT Score 
Prediction. The effect of Time-1 thermometer 
preferences was smaller in the prediction condition 
compared to the no-prediction condition, b = -.12, SE = 
.030, t(143.84) = -3.92, p < .001. Conversely, the effect 
of IAT scores was larger in the prediction compared to 
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the no-prediction condition, b = .13, SE = .026, t(149.67) 
= 4.84, p < .001.  
Using dummy codes, we decomposed these 
interactions and calculated simples slopes for the effects 
of both predictors within the two experimental 
conditions (see Table 2). When participants predicted 
their IAT scores, their IAT scores significantly predicted 
their Time-2 thermometer preferences over and above 
their Time-1 thermometer preferences (upper two cells). 
In contrast, when they did not predict their IAT scores, 
there was no relation between Time-2 thermometer 
preferences and IAT scores over and above Time-1 
thermometer preferences, and Time-2 thermometer 
preferences were more consistent with Time-1 ratings 
(lower two cells). That is, participants who predicted 
their IAT scores adapted their explicit preferences to be 
more in line with the patterns of their implicit 
preferences, whereas participants who did not predict 
their IAT scores did not adapt their explicit preferences.  
Another way to illustrate the increased 
incorporation of implicit preferences into explicit 
preferences in the prediction as opposed to the no-
prediction conditions is to compare the average within-
subjects correlations between implicit and explicit 
preferences before and after the prediction manipulation. 
At baseline, the average within-subject correlation 
between Time-1 thermometer preferences and IAT 
scores was .21 (CI95% [.13; .29]) across conditions, which 
is similar to the average size of implicit-explicit 
correlations in published meta-analyses (e.g., Hofmann, 
Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). When 
participants did not predict their IAT scores, the 
correlation at Time-2 was similar with r = .22 (CI95% 
[.11; .33]). However, when participants predicted their 
IAT scores, the correlation at Time-2 was larger with r = 
.37 (CI95% [.26; .48]), demonstrating that participants’ 
patterns of explicit preferences became more in line with 
their implicit preferences.3 
Whether or not participants completed IATs had no 
significant effect on whether they adapted their explicit 
preferences to their implicit preferences, as indicated by 
a non-significant interaction between IAT Scores and 
IAT Completion, b = .03, SE = .026, t(149.67) = 1.17, p 
= .25. Although the simple slopes in Table 2 might 
suggest that participants in the prediction condition 
adapted their Time-2 thermometer preferences more 
when they also completed IATs than when they did not 
                                                 
3 Testing whether these average within-subjects correlations are 
significantly different from each other involves the same analysis 
described earlier in this section, but without controlling for Time-1 
thermometer preference ratings (which leads to a reduction in power to 
detect an effect). Specifically, we regressed person-standardized Time-
2 thermometer preferences on IAT scores on Level-1, and then tested 
whether this relation interacts with condition. Consistent with the 
overall analysis, this less powerful analysis revealed a significant 
complete IATs (.31 as opposed to .23, upper two cells), 
the difference between the two slopes was not 
statistically significant, b = .04, SE = .037, t(147.17) = 
1.12, p = .27. The three-way interaction between the IAT 
Scores, IAT Score Prediction, and IAT Completion was 
not statistically significant either, b = .01, SE = .026, t = 
0.40, p = .69.  
In addition to these findings, there was a non-
significant trend for participants to report less consistent 
thermometer preferences when they did than when they 
did not complete IATs, reflected in a marginal 
interaction between thermometer preferences at Time-1 
and IAT Completion, b = -.05, SE = .030, t(143.84) = -
1.72, p = .087 (see Table 1, cells on the left vs. right). 
This effect could be due to the larger time difference 
between the two sets of thermometer ratings when 
participants completed IATs between them.  
Because the present study included a very diverse 
sample, with only 38.7% identifying exclusively as 
White (see above), it is worth noting that none of the 
effects described above interacted with the ethnic 
background of the participants. The adaptation of 
explicit preferences to implicit preferences was similar 
when we split the sample by ethnic background. The 
interaction of IAT Score Prediction and IAT Scores as 
well as the interaction of IAT Score Prediction and 
Time-1 thermometer preferences were not qualified by 
significant three-way interactions with a White vs. non-
White contrast, both ts < 1, both ps > .34. 
In sum, IAT score prediction led to a change in 
explicit preferences from Time-1 to Time-2, such that 
participants showed a pattern of explicit preferences at 
Time-2 that was more in line with their implicit 
preferences. This result is especially remarkable given 
that participants did not receive any feedback about their 
IAT scores and half of them had not yet completed any 
IATs. Actual completion of the IATs did not lead to any 
adaptation of explicit preferences to implicit preferences, 
nor did it amplify the effect of predicting IAT scores. 
Explicit pro-White bias. Following Hahn et al. 
(2014), we also tested whether the increased alignment 
between implicit and explicit preferences is associated 
with greater explicit pro-White bias. Such an effect may 
indicate that the IAT score prediction task makes 
participants realize that they are more biased than they 
would like, which has been claimed to be a necessary 
first step in counteracting discrimination (e.g., Monteith 
interaction between IAT Scores and IAT Score Prediction in predicting 
Time-2 thermometer preference scores, b = .08, SE = .038, t(146.00) = 
1.97, p = .050, confirming that Time-2 thermometer preferences were 
more strongly correlated with IAT scores in the prediction as opposed 
to the no-prediction condition. 
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& Mark, 2005). Note that an increase in mean-levels 
does not necessarily follow from increased implicit-
explicit correlations. Increased implicit-explicit 
correlations may occur without participants reporting 
more bias (e.g., when increased correlations result from 
increased explicit bias against some groups decreased 
explicit bias against others); and participants may report 
more bias even if implicit-explicit correlations remain 
unchanged (e.g., when participants show the same 
increase in explicit bias for all groups). Hence, we tested 
whether predicting IAT scores increases the overall level 
of explicit bias against minorities in a separate statistical 
analysis.4 
Toward this end, we first averaged explicit pro-
White preferences across the three minority groups (i.e., 
Asian vs. White, Black vs. White, and Latino vs. White; 
Cronbach’s α Time-1 = .64, Cronbach’s α Time-2 = .74). 
We then submitted these average explicit pro-White 
preference scores to a 2 (Time of Feeling Thermometer 
Ratings) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 (IAT 
Completion) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the first factor. Results are presented in Figure 2. To 
simplify the interpretation of the figure, the first factor is 
presented as a change score, reflecting the difference 
between thermometer preference scores at Time-2 and 
Time-1. Positive values on this score indicate that 
participants reported greater explicit pro-White 
preference at Time-2 compared to Time-1; negative 
values indicate that they reported smaller explicit pro-
White preference at Time-2 compared to Time-1.  
There was a significant two-way interaction of IAT 
Score Prediction and Time, F(1, 146) = 12.48, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .079. Participants who predicted their IAT scores 
showed greater explicit bias against minorities at Time-
2 compared with Time-1, F(1, 146) = 9.25, p = .003, ηp2 
= .060, whereas participants who did not predict their 
IAT scores, showed marginally smaller explicit bias at 
Time-2 compared with Time-1, F(1,146) = 3.82, p = 
.053, ηp2 = .025. IAT Completion did not have any 
effects on changes in explicit bias from Time-1 to Time-
2. The two-way interaction of IAT Completion and Time 
as well as the three-way interaction of IAT Score 
Prediction, IAT Completion, and Time were not 
statistically significant, both Fs < 1, both ps > .55. 
To investigate whether ratings of Whites or ratings 
of minorities were primarily responsible for this change, 
we looked at changes in those ratings separately 
(Cronbach’s α for the average absolute ratings of the 
three minority groups Time-1 = .71, Time-2 = .79). 
                                                 
4 We did not test for bias level changes for children or celebrities, 
because we had no hypotheses about the direction of such changes. 
Acknowledging the reactions reflected in implicit evaluations of 
children and celebrities may lead some participants to report more 
negative and others to report more positive evaluations towards these 
Results showed that the obtained increase explicit pro-
White bias stems mainly from the fact that participants 
reported less warmth towards the three minority groups 
after as opposed to before predicting their IAT scores 
(MChange = -2.284, SE = 1.10), F(1, 146) = 4.28, p = .040, 
ηp2 = .028, whereas average warmth ratings for 
minorities in the no-prediction condition did not 
significantly differ before and after the prediction task 
(MChange = 1.67, SE = 1.10), F(1,146) = 2.30, p = .132, 
ηp2 = .015. Ratings of White targets did not change in 
response to the manipulations, all Fs < 1.1., all ps > .30 
(individual ratings are presented in Supplemental 
Materials Section B).  
As with the adaptation results, the effect of IAT 
Score Prediction on mean-level changes in explicit pro-
White bias over time did not interact with participants’ 
own minority status, F (1, 142) = 0.00, p = .99, ηp2 = 
.000. Participants of all backgrounds reported more 
explicit pro-White bias (or less explicit anti-White bias) 
when they predicted their IAT scores than when they did 
not. Non-White participants reported less pro-White bias 
(and in some cases anti-White bias) overall, which was 
reflected in a significant main effect of ethnic 
background on thermometer preference scores, F(1,142) 
= 5.11, p = .025, ηp2 = .035. However, the observed 
changes in explicit preference scores from Time-1 to 
Time-2 as a result of IAT score prediction were in the 
same direction regardless of the minority status of the 
participants. 
Discussion 
Hahn et al. (2014) found that participants changed 
their explicit preferences to be more in line with their 
implicit preferences and reported more explicit pro-
White bias after predicting and completing IATs. The 
goal of Study 1 was to test whether this effect that was 
due to IAT score prediction, IAT completion, or a 
combination of both. Results showed that predicting IAT 
scores was sufficient to produce change in explicit 
preferences. Participants who predicted their scores on 
future IATs subsequently incorporated their implicit 
preferences more into their explicit preferences, and this 
effect was associated with greater mean levels of explicit 
pro-White bias. Completing IATs did not have any such 
effects by itself, and it did not significantly interact with 
IAT score prediction. Together, these results are 
consistent with the idea that acknowledgement of bias 
can be increased by directing people’s attention to their 
spontaneous affective reactions (e.g., by asking them to 
predict their scores on future IATs). Yet, they question 
groups. Hence, we consider these results less relevant for our main 
question regarding bias against minorities. All mean level ratings of all 
individual groups at both Time-1 and Time-2 are presented in 
Supplemental Materials Section B. 
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the idea that IAT completion increases 
acknowledgement of bias by giving people an 
opportunity to observe behavioral effects of their 
attitudes. They are also inconsistent with the notion that 
announcement of a test alone can suffice to produce 
acknowledgement of bias. Although we did not include 
a separate condition that included only an announcement 
of a bias test, the fact that IAT completion alone did not 
lead to more acknowledgement than the control 
condition (where there was no announcement of a test at 
any point before IAT completion, which happened after 
the second set of thermometer ratings) speaks against the 
interpretation that knowledge that one’s biases will be 
revealed may produce acknowledgement of bias. 
Study 2 
One potential reason for the null effect of IAT 
completion in Study 1 is that participants did not realize 
that the IATs assessed their implicit biases, given that the 
IAT was introduced as a “categorization task” rather than 
a measure of implicit bias. Because each IAT was named 
with the labels of the social groups (e.g., “BLACK-
WHITE IAT”) and these names were repeatedly 
mentioned in the instructions, we find such an 
interpretation rather implausible. Still, to ensure 
participants understood that the IAT is supposed to be a 
measure of implicit bias, we included this information in 
the instructions of Study 2, which aimed to replicate the 
findings of Study 1 on a sample of German university 
students.  
Germany has been one of the most immigrated-to 
countries in the world over the past 50 years, with 13.5% 
of the population reporting being born outside of 
Germany and an additional 6.8% reporting non-German 
family backgrounds in 2014 (German Federal Agency 
for Civic Education, 2016; German Federal Statistical 
Office, 2015). Hence, issues of discrimination and 
prejudice against ethnic minorities are at the center of 
heated societal debates. However, because the largest 
groups of immigrants in Germany have come from 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Turkey, and the 
Middle East (German Federal Statistical Office, 2015), 
the social categories around which these discussions 
revolve align more along cultural differences, religion, 
and ethnicity, than along the racial categories that are 
typically at the center of North-American debates.5 Thus, 
a replication in Germany, where ethnic discrimination 
and prejudice are salient discussion topics, but 
participants can be assumed to have different 
                                                 
5 In 2014, the proportion of the German population with backgrounds 
in Africa, Asia, or Latin America, was 0.7%, 1.0%, and 0.3%, 
respectively (German Federal Statistical Office, 2015). 
6 Power estimates for the multi-level analyses were obtained by running 
individual regressions for each participant, saving the resulting slopes 
per participant, and then running ANOVAs on those slopes and 
experiences with the specific groups in question, 
represents an interesting extension to Study 1 (see Hahn, 
Judd, & Park, 2010, for more details on national 
differences and diversity). 
Method 
Participants and design. We aimed at recruiting 
approximately 200 participants. Using the effect sizes 
obtained in Study 1 and the GPower software to estimate 
statistical power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007), a sample of 200 provides a power of 97% in 
replicating the obtained adaptation of explicit 
preferences to implicit preferences.6 Two-hundred-and-
five participants from a large urban University in 
Germany completed the study in exchange for 
experimental credit or a payment of 6€ (and some 
candy). Ten of these participants indicated having 
participated in an earlier study with the same IAT 
prediction paradigm. Two additional participants 
responded within less than 300 ms on more than 10% of 
the trials on one or more of the IATs (see Greenwald et 
al., 2003). Data from these participants were excluded 
from the following analyses. Of the remaining 193 
participants (81.9% female, median age = 22 years, age 
range = 17-44 years), 70.5% reported exclusive German 
ancestry, 23.3% indicated being born in Germany from 
one or two parents with non-German backgrounds, and 
8.8% indicated being foreign-born themselves. When 
asked about racial categories (relevant for the IATs in the 
study), 84.5% of the sample identified exclusively as 
White, 5.2% as Middle-Eastern or both White and 
Middle-Eastern, 3.1% as East-Asian, 2.1% as both White 
and Latino, and 1.0% as South-Asian. The remaining 
4.1% indicated “other” or did not report any ethnic 
background.7 In addition to the continuous multi-level 
aspect of the design (see Study 1), the study consisted of 
a 2 (Time of Feeling Thermometer Ratings: Time-1 vs. 
Time-2) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction: prediction vs. no 
prediction) × 2 (IAT Completion: completed vs. not 
completed) mixed design, with the first variable being a 
within-subjects factor and the other two being between-
subjects factors. 
Materials and procedure. The materials and 
procedures were similar to Study 1, except for a few 
minor changes in the procedure and the instructions. All 
materials were translated and administered in German, 
which led to minor changes in the wording of the 
prediction task. IAT score predictions were measured 
with 7-point instead of 11-point scales ranging from 1 
calculating ηp
2 –values. By ignoring the multi-level nature of the 
calculations, they likely underestimate the actual statistical power in 
replicating the obtained effects. 
7 The proportions of ethnic backgrounds in the four experimental 
conditions were too small to allow for statistical comparisons between 
participants with different backgrounds in this study. 
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(substantially more positive towards ASIAN 
[BLACK/LATINO/CELEBRITY/CHILD, respectively]) 
to 7 (substantially more positive towards WHITE 
[REGULAR/ADULT, respectively]). Participants also 
read one additional paragraph before making their 
predictions, detailing that philosophers, anthropologists, 
and psychologists have long suspected that there are 
different kinds of attitudes. The purpose of this 
paragraph was to emphasize that implicit preferences 
reflect a construct that is different from explicit 
preferences, which should reduce potential demand to 
align explicit with implicit preferences. 
Participants in Study 2 also received more 
information about the IAT. The additional information 
read: You will now complete a series of tasks known as 
the IAT – the Implicit Association Test. The IAT 
measures your implicit attitudes. As in Study 1, each 
individual IAT was introduced with the social categories 
in question (e.g., the next four tasks belong to the 
BLACK-WHITE IAT). The IATs again showed 
satisfactory reliabilities (Cronbach’s α values for 
BLACK-WHITE = .78, ASIAN-WHITE = .68, 
LATINO-WHITE = .74, CHILD-ADULT = .61, 
CELEBRITY-REGULAR = .59). 
After signing informed consent, participants 
completed the first thermometer ratings for the eight 
groups described in Study 1. Next, participants in the 
prediction condition predicted their scores on the five 
IATs on the 7-point scales described above, while 
participants in the no-predictions condition answered the 
five consumer preference questions from Study 1 on 
similar 7-point scales. Afterwards, half of the 
participants completed the IATs and then provided their 
second thermometer ratings, while the other half went 
straight to completing the second thermometer ratings. 
Next, all participants completed the exploratory 
measures described in Supplemental Materials Section 
A. Participants in the no-completion condition were 
asked to complete the five IATs after the exploratory 
measures. Finally, all participants provided demographic 
information, including information about previous 
participation in the study and optional feedback, before 
they were debriefed and compensated. 
Results 
Prediction accuracy. Accuracy in the prediction of 
IAT scores was analyzed in line with the procedures of 
Study 1. The 95 participants who predicted their IAT 
                                                 
8 For the celebrity-regular IAT, we found a significant main effect of 
IAT Score Prediction, F(1, 189) = 6.67, p = .011, η2p = .034, a marginal 
main effect of IAT Completion, F(1, 189) = 2.88, p = .092, η2p = .015, 
and a marginal interaction of the two factors, F(1, 189) = 3.49, p = .063, 
η2p = .018. Inspection of the mean patterns revealed that participants in 
the prediction plus IAT-at-end-of-study condition showed no average 
bias with an IAT D score of D = .053, SE = .054, whereas participants 
in the other three conditions showed the expected pro-celebrity bias 
scores showed similar levels of accuracy as in Study 1, b 
= .49, SE = .040, t(474) = 12.19, p < .001, median within-
subject correlation of r = .60. 
IAT scores. Separate 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 
(IAT Completion) ANOVAs for each of the five IATs 
revealed that average levels of implicit preferences were 
unaffected by our manipulations, all Fs < 2.80, all p > 
.09, the only the exception being the celebrity-regular 
person IAT.8 The correlation between average IAT 
scores in the prediction and the no-prediction conditions 
was r = .97, again indicating identical patterns of implicit 
preferences across the two conditions. Together, these 
findings suggest that the prediction task did not influence 
IAT scores. 
Alignment between explicit and implicit biases. 
As in Study 1, we conducted a multi-level analysis to test 
whether (1) participants changed their explicit 
preferences from Time-1 to Time-2 to be more in line 
with the patterns of their implicit preferences, and (2) 
whether this adaptation effect depended on our 
manipulations of IAT Score Prediction and IAT 
Completion (or both). Toward this end, we 
simultaneously regressed participants’ Time-2 
thermometer preference scores onto their Time-1 
thermometer preference scores and their IAT scores on 
Level-1 (all person-standardized), and then modeled the 
average per-participant relationships as a function of the 
two experimental factors and their interactions on Level-
2. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3; 
simple slopes in the four experimental conditions are 
depicted in Table 4. 
Results showed a significant effect of Time-1 
thermometer preferences, b = .80, SE = .021, t(201.89) = 
37.89, p < .001, indicating a substantial degree of 
consistency in thermometer preferences over time. There 
was also a significant main effect of IAT scores over and 
above Time-1 thermometer preferences, b = .11, SE = 
.020, t(201.96) = 5.58, p < .001, supporting the predicted 
increase in the alignment of explicit and implicit 
preferences. Replicating the results of Study 1, both 
effects were qualified by significant interactions with 
IAT Score Prediction. Participants who predicted their 
IAT scores showed less consistency in their thermometer 
preferences over time, as indicated by a significant 
interaction of Time-1 thermometer preferences and IAT 
Score Prediction, b = -.05, SE = .040, t(201.89) = -2.22, 
p = .027. At the same time, IAT scores showed a stronger 
with scores between -.135 and -.182, all SEs = .053. Because this 
pattern did not replicate in any of the other studies and the celebrity-
regular IAT is not of primary concern to our theoretical question, we 
treat this finding as a false-positive and do not discuss it further. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology   12 
 
© 2019 American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. 
Please do not copy or cite without author's permission. The final article is available, upon publication, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000155 
relation to Time-2 thermometer preferences for 
participants who predicted their IAT scores compared to 
participants who did not predict their IAT scores, 
indicated by a significant interaction of IAT scores and 
IAT Score Prediction, b = .09, SE = .020, t(201.96) = 
4.51, p < .001. Thus, replicating the finding of Study 1, 
prediction of IAT scores led participants to adapt the 
patterns of their explicit preferences to be more in line 
with their implicit preferences.  
Analyses of simple within-subject implicit-explicit 
correlations showed that IAT scores and thermometer 
preferences were correlated with r = .32 (CI95% [.26; 
.38]) at Time-1. At Time-2, this correlation increased to 
r = .45 (CI95% [.37; .53]) for participants who predicted 
their IAT scores, but it remained at r = .30 (CI95% [.22; 
.38]) for participants who did not predict their IAT 
scores.9  
In addition to the effects of IAT Score Prediction, 
there was a marginal interaction between IAT Scores and 
IAT Completion, b = .04, SE = .020, t(201.96) = 1.88, p 
= .062, indicating that IAT scores showed a stronger 
relation to Time-2 thermometer preferences for 
participants who had completed the IATs by the time 
they provided their second thermometer scores 
compared to participants who had not completed the 
IATs (compare slopes for IAT scores in cells on the left 
with cells on the right-hand side in Table 4). Note, 
however, that (1) the effect of IAT completion alone was 
much weaker than the effect of IAT score prediction 
alone (adaptation slope of .07 compared to an adaptation 
slope of .17), (2) the critical interaction effect was only 
marginally significant, and (3) no such effect was found 
in Study 1.  
The interaction of Time-1 thermometer preferences 
and IAT Score Prediction was further qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction with IAT Completion, 
b = .04, SE = .021, t(201.89) = 2.12, p = .035. As shown 
in Table 2, participants who had neither completed the 
IATs nor predicted their IAT scores showed almost 
identical patterns in their thermometer preferences at 
Time-1 and Time-2 (slope based on standardized values 
at .93, lower right cell), whereas consistency in 
thermometer preferences was lower in the other three 
conditions (each of which included at least one 
intervention). This result suggests that either one of the 
two interventions (i.e., IAT score prediction, IAT 
completion) was sufficient to reduce the consistency of 
thermometer preferences from Time-1 to Time-2 in 
Study 2 (a minor variation on the results of Study 1, 
where IAT score prediction and IAT completion each 
independently lowered consistency in two independent 
two-way interactions). 
                                                 
9 As in Study 1, repeating the analysis without controlling for Time-1 
thermometer preference scores confirmed that these average 
Explicit pro-White bias. To investigate changes in 
mean-levels of explicit bias against minorities, we again 
averaged explicit pro-White bias across the three 
minority groups (Cronbach’s α Time-1 = .63, 
Cronbach’s α Time-2 = .73) and submitted these 
preference scores to the same 2 (Time of Feeling 
Thermometer Ratings) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 
(IAT Completion) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor. Results are presented in 
Figure 3, depicting average change in preference scores 
over time. Replicating the results of Study 1, there was a 
significant interaction of Time and IAT Score Prediction, 
F(1, 189) = 5.38, p = .021, ηp2 = .028. Participants who 
predicted their IAT scores reported marginally more 
explicit pro-White bias over time, F(1, 189) = 3.36, p = 
.068, ηp2 = .017, whereas participants who did not predict 
their IAT scores did not show any changes over time, 
F(1, 189) = 2.09, p = .15, ηp2 = .011. Again replicating 
the results of Study 1, there was no significant interaction 
between IAT Completion and Time, nor was there a 
significant three-way interaction of IAT Score 
Prediction, IAT Completion, and Time, both Fs < 0.20, 
ps > .65. Hence, even though participants who completed 
IATs tended to adapt their explicit preferences to be 
more in line with their implicit preferences, IAT 
completion did not influence the overall size of explicit 
pro-White bias which, if anything, showed an effect in 
the opposite direction (see bar on the far-right in Figure 
3). 
Follow-up analyses confirmed that the increase in 
explicit pro-White bias resulting from IAT score 
prediction was driven by more negative evaluations of 
minorities compared to Whites (Cronbach’s α for 
absolute minority ratings: Time-1 = .80, Time-2 = .82). 
Participants’ warmth ratings for minorities significantly 
decreased after IAT score prediction (MChange = -2.14, SE 
= .59), F(1, 189) = 13.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .066, but there 
was no change in the no-prediction condition (MChange = 
-0.82, SE = .58), F(1, 189) = 2.01, p = .158, ηp2 = .011. 
Ratings of Whites did not change in response to IAT 
score prediction, (MChange = -0.58, SE = .85), F(1, 189) = 
0.46, p = .499, ηp2 = .002, and in fact became more 
negative in the no-predictions condition (MChange = -2.03, 
SE = .84), F(1, 189) = 5.87, p = .016, ηp2 = .030. Thus, 
replicating the results of Study 1, increased alignment 
between explicit and implicit preferences again 
translated into stronger explicit pro-White (anti-
minority) bias (individual ratings are presented in 
Supplemental Materials Section B). 
correlations were significantly different from each other, b = .08, SE = 
.029, t(189.00) = 2.57, p = .011. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 replicated the main findings of Study 1 in a 
sample of German participants. As in Study 1, prediction 
of IAT scores changed explicit preferences such that (1) 
explicit preferences became more in line with implicit 
preferences and (2) participants showed greater levels of 
explicit pro-White bias. These results provide further 
support for the idea that acknowledgement of bias can be 
increased by directing people’s attention to their 
spontaneous affective reactions (e.g., by asking them to 
predict their scores on future IATs).  
Different from Study 1, participants in Study 2 also 
showed a marginal adaptation effect in response to 
completing IATs. This finding is consistent with the idea 
that IAT completion may increase acknowledgement of 
bias by giving participants an opportunity to observe 
behavioral effects of their attitudes, or by increasing 
anticipation that one’s biases will be revealed (the two 
factors are not dissociated in Studies 1 and 2). However, 
no such effect was found in Study 1, the critical 
interaction effect was only marginal in Study 2, and IAT 
completion did not increase mean-levels of explicit pro-
White bias in either study. Thus, even if IAT completion 
influences acknowledgement of bias via self-perception 
or via knowledge of measurement, such effects seem to 
be less reliable and less consistent compared to the 
effects of IAT score prediction. A potential interpretation 
of this difference is that many participants interpret their 
responses on the IAT in a manner that is unrelated to 
personal bias (Monteith et al., 2001), which may 
counteract acknowledgement of bias in response to IAT 
completion.  
Study 3 
The IAT procedures in the preceding studies differ 
from the ones in many classroom exercises, online IATs, 
and bias awareness trainings, in that participants did not 
receive any feedback on their levels of bias. Thus, a 
major goal of Study 3 was to investigate whether IAT 
feedback can increase acknowledgement of bias 
independent of the obtained effects of IAT score 
prediction. Although such an effect would be consistent 
with the idea that people are unable to know their 
implicit biases without feedback on their personal 
measurement scores, we deem IAT feedback unlikely to 
increase acknowledgement of bias for two reasons. First, 
Hahn et al. (2014) found that people can predict the 
patterns of their IAT scores with a high level of accuracy 
(replicated in Studies 1 and 2), which poses a challenge 
to the idea that people do not know their implicit biases 
unless they receive personal feedback. Second, research 
by Howell and colleagues suggests that participants tend 
                                                 
10 GPower estimations suggested a total sample size of 200 participants 
for Study 3. Based on the current design with six between-subjects 
to react defensively to IAT feedback when it suggests a 
level of bias that is stronger than what participants would 
ascribe to themselves (Howell et al., 2015; Howell & 
Ratliff, 2017). However, neither of these findings rules 
out the possibility that IAT feedback increases the 
alignment of implicit and explicit preferences and 
overall levels of explicit pro-White bias, as we found for 
IAT score prediction in Studies 1 and 2. Thus, to address 
this question more directly, Study 3 used the same design 
as Study 2, the only difference being the inclusion of an 
additional condition in the manipulation of IAT 
completion. Whereas participants in Study 2 did or did 
not complete IATs without feedback, participants in 
Study 3 either (1) did not complete IATs, (2) completed 
the IATs without feedback, or (3) completed with 
feedback.  
Method 
Participants and design. Based on the procedure to 
estimate statistical power in Study 2, we aimed for a 
sample size of approximately 240 participants to account 
for the additional between-subjects conditions.10 In 
anticipation of potential exclusions, we recruited 257 
participants at the same large urban university in 
Germany as in Study 2. Participants received either 6€ or 
experimental credit (and some candy) for their 
participation. Twelve participants indicated having 
participated in a study with the same IAT score 
prediction paradigm before, and two participants 
responded in less than 300 ms on more than 10% of the 
IAT trials (see Greenwald et al., 2003). These 
participants were excluded from the following analyses. 
Of the remaining 243 participants (79.0% female, 
median age = 22 years, age range = 18-66 years), 75.6% 
reported exclusively German ancestry, 18.5% having 
one or two non-German parents, and 5.8% being foreign-
born themselves. Considering racial categories, 86.4% 
identified as exclusively White, 7.0% Middle-Eastern or 
both White and Middle-Eastern, 2.1% as Latino or both 
White and Latino, one participant (0.4%) identified as 
Black, and the remaining 4.1% as another category or a 
mix of several racial categories. In addition to the 
continuous multi-level aspect of the design (see Study 1), 
the study consisted of a 2 (Time of Feeling Thermometer 
Ratings: Time-1 vs. Time-2) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction: 
prediction vs. no prediction) × 3 (IAT Completion: not 
completed vs. completed without feedback vs. 
completed with feedback) mixed design, with the first 
variable being a within-subjects factor and the other two 
being between-subjects factors. 
IAT feedback. Study 3 contained one additional 
level in the manipulation of IAT completion: IAT 
conditions, we rounded this number up to 240 to have at least 40 
participants per condition. 
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completion with feedback. In this condition, participants 
completed IATs before their Time-2 thermometer 
ratings as in the IAT completed conditions of Studies 1 
and 2, but additionally received feedback on their 
performance similar to the IAT webpage. Using the 
psychological lab software Inquisit, an automatized 
script calculated each participant’s IAT D score 
(Greenwald et al., 2003) for each of the five IATs and 
converted these scores into personal feedback 
statements: Your data suggest […] automatic preference 
for [group A] over [group B]. Based on the cutoffs for 
feedback on the IAT website, the qualifiers in this 
statement were little to no for |D| <= .15, a slight for .15 
< |D|<= .35, a moderate for .35 <|D|<=.65, and a strong 
for |D|>=.65. The relevant groups were imputed 
according to the sign of the D score.  
Materials and procedure. The materials and 
procedure were identical to those of Study 2, the only 
exception being the addition of the IAT completion with 
feedback condition. After participants provided their 
Time-1 thermometer ratings, and then predicted (or not) 
their IAT scores, one third completed the five IATs and 
received feedback, one third completed the IATs without 
feedback, and one third did not complete the IATs. 
Afterwards all participants completed the Time-2 
thermometer ratings and the exploratory measures of 
downstream consequences described in Supplemental 
Materials Section A. As in Study 2, participants in the 
no-completion condition completed the IATs at the end 
of the study after the exploratory measures. The five 
IATs again showed satisfactory reliabilities (Cronbach’s 
α values for BLACK-WHITE = .71, ASIAN-WHITE = 
.69, LATINO-WHITE = .69, CHILD-ADULT = .67, 
CELEBRITY-REGULAR = .57).11 
Results 
Prediction accuracy. Accuracy in the prediction of 
IAT scores was analyzed in line with procedures of 
Study 1. The 125 participants who predicted their IAT 
scores predicted them slightly more accurately than in 
Studies 1 and 2, with values closer to those reported by 
Hahn et al. (2014), mean: b = .51, SE = .036, t(124) = 
14.19, p < .001, median correlation: r = .64. 
IAT scores. We again found no evidence for mean-
level differences in IAT scores across the six conditions, 
all Fs < 2.10, all p > .12. A correlation of r = .99 between 
the patterns of average IAT scores in the prediction and 
no-prediction conditions further indicated that IAT 
scores were unaffected by the prediction task. 
                                                 
11 There was one difference in the IATs in Study 3 compared to the 
previous studies. In Studies 1 and 2, participants completed 20 training 
trials for the sorting of the faces (Block 1) before the initial combined 
block, and 40 training trials with the reversed sorting (Block 3) before 
the reversed combined block. In Study 3, the second training block 
Alignment between explicit and implicit biases. 
To test whether participants adapted their explicit 
preferences to be more line with the patterns of their 
implicit preferences, we again regressed person-
standardized scores of their Time-2 thermometer 
preference scores onto person-standardized IAT scores 
and Time-1 thermometer preference scores 
simultaneously on Level-1 of a multi-level design, and 
then tested if the resulting slopes differed by condition 
on Level-2 in a 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 3 (IAT 
Completion) design. Because the IAT completion 
manipulation encompassed three levels in the current 
study, we used two contrast codes, one that compared the 
no-completion condition (coded -2) to the two 
completion conditions (both coded +1), and another 
contrast code that tested whether the effects of IAT 
completion with feedback (coded +1) differed from the 
effects of completing IATs without feedback (coded -1). 
Model results and simples slopes are presented in Tables 
5 and 6. 
There was a significant main effect of Time-1 
thermometer preferences indicating a substantial level of 
consistency in thermometer preferences, b = .78, SE = 
.020, t(242.05) = 39.70, p < .001. There was also a 
significant main effect of IAT scores indicating that 
participants adapted their Time-2 thermometer 
preferences to their IAT scores, b = .14, SE = .019, 
t(260.42) = 5.61, p <.001. As in Studies 1 and 2, both of 
those effects were qualified by significant interactions 
with IAT Score Prediction. Participants who predicted 
their IAT scores showed significantly less consistency in 
their thermometer preferences, which was reflected in a 
significant interaction between Time-1 thermometer 
preferences and IAT Score Prediction, b = -.09, SE = 
.020, t(242.05) = -4.71, p < .001. Moreover, participants 
who predicted their IAT scores adapted their Time-2 
thermometer preferences significantly more to their IAT 
scores, which was reflected in a significant interaction 
between IAT scores and IAT Score Prediction, b = .11, 
SE = .019, t(260.42) = 5.61, p < .001. As can be seen 
from comparing the second to the fourth row of data in 
Table 5, participants adapted their explicit preferences 
only when they predicted their IAT scores, but not when 
they did not predict their IAT scores. In terms of simple 
within-subjects correlations, Time-1 thermometer 
preference scores were correlated with IAT scores at r = 
.34 (CI95% [.28; .40]) across conditions. Time-2 
thermometer preference scores were correlated with IAT 
scores at r = .30 (CI95% [.22; .38]) in the no-predictions 
included only 20 trials. Given the satisfactory reliabilities, this 
difference is not discussed further. 
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condition, but at r = .50 (CI95% [.41; .58]) in the 
prediction condition.12 
There was also a significant interaction of IAT 
scores with the contrast comparing the no-completion 
condition with the two completion conditions, b = .04, 
SE = .014, t(260.37) = 2.62, p = .009, meaning that IAT 
completion led to significantly more adaptation than no 
IAT completion when collapsing across the feedback 
and no-feedback conditions. Further analyses with 
additional contrast codes revealed that this effect was 
driven by the fact that participants adapted their scores 
more to their IAT scores after they completed IATs with 
feedback than when they did not complete IATs, b = .06, 
SE = .023, t(265.00) = 2.72, p = .007 (compare slopes of 
IAT score in left-most column, .33 and .07, with right-
most column in Table 6, .16 and .02). , Similar to the 
effects found in Study 2. the degree of adaptation in the 
IAT without feedback condition (center column) differed 
only marginally from the no-IAT condition, b = .04, SE 
= .023, t(255.92) = 1.82, p = .069. The IAT completion 
with or without feedback conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other, b = .02, SE = .023, 
t(260.44) = 0.89, p = .376.13 This result suggests that IAT 
completion with feedback may increase 
acknowledgement of bias. Note, however, that the effect 
of IAT plus feedback alone was much smaller than the 
effect of IAT score prediction (.07 compared to .16), and 
even though an overall main effect suggested that IAT 
completion with feedback led to more adaption than no 
IAT completion, the simple slope of adaptation in the 
IAT completion plus feedback condition was not 
significant in and of itself (lower left-most column), b = 
.07, SE = .047, t(266.21) = 1.47, p = .143. At the same 
time, none of the possible contrasts we tested for IAT 
completion interacted with the IAT prediction 
manipulation, all ts < 1, all ps > .37, indicating that the 
effects of IAT completion were not significantly smaller 
in the no-prediction compared to the prediction 
conditions (even if not significant in and of themselves). 
In sum, results suggested that IAT completion with 
feedback may lead to increased alignment of implicit and 
explicit evaluations overall in addition to other factors, 
but results remained inconclusive regarding the effect of 
IAT completion with feedback alone. 
There was also a significant three-way interaction 
between Time-1 thermometer preferences, IAT Score 
Prediction, and the contrast comparing the two IAT 
completion conditions with the no IAT completion 
condition, b = -.03, SE = .014, t(241.96) = -2.24, p = .026 
                                                 
12 Testing the difference between the two average within-subjects 
correlations by repeating the described analysis without controlling for 
Time-1 thermometer scores replicated the significant interaction of 
IAT scores and IAT Score Prediction in predicting Time-2 
thermometer ratings, b = .10, SE = .030, t(237.00) = 3.22, p = .001. 
(see Table 5). For participants who predicted their IAT 
scores, thermometer preferences were less consistent 
when they completed IATs than when they did not 
complete IATs, b = -.05, SE = .019, t(249.55) = -2.73, p 
= .007 (see first row of data in Table 6: .63 and .63, vs. 
.79). For participants who did not predict their IAT 
scores, IAT completion had no effect on consistency in 
thermometer preferences, b = .01, SE = .020, t(234.93) = 
0.47, p = .636 (see third row of data in Table 6: .84 and 
.91 vs. .85). Recall that we found less consistency in 
thermometer ratings in response to IAT completion in 
both Studies 1 and 2. The interaction presented here 
means that in the current study, this effect was replicated 
only in the prediction condition, but not in the no-
prediction condition. However, given that the effect is 
small and driven by an outlier in the IAT no-feedback 
condition that is a straight replication of Studies 1 and 2 
(slope of .91, see Table 6) we believe that this particular 
shape of a three-way interaction may be a false positive. 
In sum, completing IATs with feedback led to less 
consistency in Thermometer ratings when combined 
with prediction, and possibly to more adaptation of 
explicit to implicit attitudes in Study 3, although the 
latter effect remained inconclusive. 
Explicit pro-White bias. We again investigated 
mean-level changes in explicit pro-White bias by first 
averaging explicit preference for Whites across the three 
minority groups (Cronbach’s α Time-1 = .72, Time-2 = 
.77) and submitting these scores to a 2 (Time of Feeling 
Thermometer Ratings) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 3 
(IAT Completion) mixed ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the first factor. Figure 4 depicts Time-2 
minus Time-1 difference scores as a function of 
condition. Replicating the results of Studies 1 and 2, 
there was a significant interaction between Time and 
IAT Score Prediction, F(1, 237) = 7.13, p = .008, ηp2 = 
.029. Participants who predicted their IAT scores 
reported significantly more explicit bias over time, F(1, 
237) = 13.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .055, whereas participants 
who did not predict their IAT scores did not show any 
changes over time, F(1, 237) = 0.02, p = .90, ηp2 = .000. 
Also replicating the results of Studies 1 and 2, there was 
no significant interaction effect of IAT Completion and 
change from Time-1 to Time 2, nor was there a 
significant interaction effect of IAT Score Prediction, 
IAT Completion, and change over time, both Fs < 1.50, 
both ps > .20. 
Follow-up analyses on individual thermometer 
ratings (Cronbach’s α for absolute minority ratings: 
13 All of these additional contrast codes were coded -1 and +1 for the 
relevant conditions that are being compared, and include an additional 
contrast code comparing the third condition (coded -2) with the two 
conditions in question (both coded +1) in the model for a full set of 
orthogonal codes. 
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Time-1 = .76, Time-2 = .81) confirmed that the obtained 
increase in explicit pro-White bias was driven by more 
negative evaluations of minorities. Participants’ warmth 
ratings for minorities significantly decreased after IAT 
score prediction (MChange = -2.38, SE = .63), F(1, 237) = 
13.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .056, but there was no change in 
the no-prediction condition (MChange = -0.53, SE = .65), 
F(1, 237) = .66, p =.419, ηp2 = .003. Ratings of Whites 
were unaffected by the prediction manipulation, both Fs 
< 0.80, ps > .38 (individual ratings are presented in 
Supplemental Materials Section B). 
Effects of feedback. The lack of an effect of IAT 
Feedback on the magnitude of explicit pro-White bias is 
particularly interesting in this study because participants 
in the feedback condition were told that they were 
biased—and in many cases more biased than they 
predicted. However, feedback may show effects only for 
participants whose feedback indicated greater levels of 
bias than they assume they hold. To test whether 
extremity of feedback influenced explicit preferences 
among the 83 participants in the feedback condition, we 
regressed changes in explicit pro-White bias (average of 
Time-2 preference ratings minus average Time-1 
preference ratings) onto a continuous measure of the 
verbal feedback. Although the relation was in the 
expected direction with more negative feedback 
indicating greater increases in explicit bias, this relation 
did not reach statistical significance, b = 1.52, SE = 1.16, 
t(79) = 1.31, p = .194.  
We also tested whether the discrepancy between 
participants’ predictions and their individual feedback is 
related to changes in explicit bias, equating the 7 choices 
on the prediction scales with the 6 feedback options (e.g., 
“slightly more positive towards White” was treated as 
equivalent to “slight automatic preference for White”; 
the choice “same reaction” on the prediction scales was 
treated as equivalent to the feedback options “little to no 
automatic preference” for either Black or White). For the 
42 participants who predicted their scores and received 
feedback, the discrepancy between predictions and 
feedback was not significantly related to changes in 
explicit bias, and the slope of the relation was in the 
opposite direction, b = -0.37, SE = 2.10, t(40) = -0.18, p 
= .86. Hence, there was no indication that the feedback 
participants received had any effect on the magnitude of 
their explicit biases. 
Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the main findings of Studies 1 and 
2. Participants who predicted their IAT scores reported 
explicit preferences that were more in line with their 
implicit preferences after than before the prediction task. 
They also showed stronger explicit bias in favor of 
Whites over minorities, again replicating a key finding 
of Studies 1 and 2. IAT completion showed similar 
effects, in that participants who had completed IATs 
without feedback also showed marginally greater 
alignment between explicit and implicit preferences. 
However, there was no effect of IAT completion on 
overall levels of explicit bias in favor of Whites over 
minorities. IATs plus feedback did lead to significantly 
greater alignment of implicit and explicit preferences 
overall, although the simple effect of alignment in 
response to feedback was not significant, and not 
significantly larger than the effects of IAT completion 
without feedback. Feedback did not lead to greater 
reported levels of bias either, and the content of the IAT 
feedback was unrelated to mean-levels of explicit 
preferences. Together, these findings provide further 
support for the idea that acknowledgement of bias can be 
increased by directing people’s attention to their 
spontaneous affective reactions (e.g., by asking them to 
predict IAT scores). Giving people an opportunity to 
observe behavioral effects of their attitudes via IAT 
completion (without feedback) may have similar effects, 
but such effects seem to be smaller in size, less consistent 
across criterion measures (i.e., marginally increased 
alignment between explicit and implicit biases vs. no 
effect on overall levels of explicit biases) and less 
reliable across studies (i.e., no effect in Study 1, marginal 
effects in Studies 2 and 3). Effects of IAT feedback were 
similarly inconsistent (significant effect on alignment 
compared to control, but no effect on size of bias), which 
is consistent with earlier findings showing that many 
participants may respond defensively to such feedback 
(see Howell et al., 2015; Howell & Ratliff, 2017). 
Although the current findings are consistent with the 
idea that IAT score prediction increases 
acknowledgement of bias, the obtained increase in 
explicit biases and greater alignment between explicit 
and implicit preferences may reflect reduced concerns 
about openly expressing one’s thoughts and feelings 
toward minorities. In this case, participants may not 
necessarily think of their openly expressed judgments as 
being biased—counter to the proposed interpretation in 
terms of increased acknowledgement of personal bias. 
To provide more compelling evidence for the proposed 
interpretation, Studies 4-6 measured acknowledgement 
of bias more directly by asking participants to rate the 
extent to which they harbor racial biases.  
Study 4 
Study 4 had three aims. The first aim was to test 
whether the obtained effects of IAT score prediction 
indeed reflect increased acknowledgement of bias. 
Toward this end, participants in Study 4 were asked to 
directly rate the extent to which they harbor racial biases 
after the manipulation of IAT score prediction. The 
second aim was to test whether the findings of Studies 1-
3 replicate in a more economical online study using a 
single standard IAT (instead of five shortened IATs), 
providing a more viable design for potential 
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interventions. Toward this end, participants predicted 
their performance on a Black-White IAT (or not) and 
then completed a standard Black-White IAT (or not) 
before they rated their level of racial bias. The third aim 
was to investigate whether the effects of IAT score 
prediction depend on non-prejudicial goals. This aim 
was based on the assumption that attention to one’s 
spontaneous affective reactions towards minority groups 
may increase acknowledgement of bias only for 
participants who endorse non-prejudicial goals. For 
participants who do not endorse non-prejudicial goals, 
recognizing negative affective reactions toward 
minorities may not conflict with personal standards, 
which should undermine the predicted increase in 
acknowledgement of bias (Monteith & Mark, 2005). To 
test this hypothesis, all participants completed a scale 
measuring non-prejudicial goals at the beginning of the 
study (Gawronski, Peters, Brochu & Strack, 2008). 
Method 
Participants and design. The study included a 2 
(IAT Score Prediction: prediction vs. no prediction) × 2 
(IAT Completion: completion vs. no completion) 
between-subjects design, using individual differences in 
non-prejudicial goals as a continuous moderator. Not 
having an empirical basis for potential effect sizes in the 
modified design of Study 4, we aimed to recruit 400 
participants, which provides a power of 80% to detect a 
significant effect of f = 0.14. Participants were recruited 
via TurkPrime and received US-$1 for completing the 
study. Out of 430 participants who began participating in 
the study, 401 completed all components. Of these 
participants, 24 responded faster than 300 ms on more 
than 10% of the trials in the IAT (see Greenwald et al., 
2003) and 19 failed at least one of two attention check 
items embedded in the non-prejudicial goals and 
acknowledgement of bias scales (see Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).14 These participants were 
excluded from analyses. Of the remaining 358 
participants (53.6% female, median age = 34 years, age 
range = 19-81 years), 77.1% identified as White, 8.9% 
as Black, 4.2% as Latino, 4.7% as Asian, and the 
remaining 5.0% as another ethnicity or a combination of 
several ethnicities. 
Non-prejudicial goals. To investigate whether 
acknowledgement of bias in reaction to predicting IAT 
scores depends on individual differences in non-
prejudicial goals, participants completed the ten items of 
Gawronski et al.’s (2008) non-prejudicial goals scale on 
7-point response options ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (Cronbach’s α = .89, 
                                                 
14 The wording of the two attention check items was: It is important for 
us to know whether you read these questions carefully. If you are 
sample item: Negative evaluations of disadvantaged 
minority groups are wrong). 
Prediction task. The IAT score prediction task was 
similar to the one in Studies 1-3. Participants received a 
short introduction to the concept of implicit attitudes, 
describing them as a different kind of attitudes. The text 
further encouraged participants to think of them as your 
spontaneous reactions towards different groups, people, 
or other targets. Those may be different from the explicit 
attitudes you would report when you have had time to 
think about them. Participants were further told that we 
were interested in whether they knew their implicit 
attitudes, and asked them to make a prediction for their 
implicit attitudes towards cats and dogs, before 
continuing to a prediction of attitudes towards social 
groups. The BLACK-WHITE IAT score prediction task 
included the 20 pictures of Black and White targets used 
in the IAT with an explanatory text detailing that 
participants would later complete the IAT. Similar to 
Studies 1-3, the prediction item read I predict that an IAT 
comparing my reactions to BLACK vs. WHITE will show 
that my implicit attitude is… and a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (a lot more positive towards BLACK) to 7 (a lot 
more positive towards WHITE). Participants in the 
control condition completed two of the five consumer 
preference questions of Studies 1-3 using similar 7-point 
scales. These questions did not mention IATs or social 
groups. 
Black-White IAT. We used the IATgen tool 
(Carpenter et al., 2017) to build and implement a 7-block 
IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) in Qualtrics, using the 
pictures of Black and White targets that were also used 
in Studies 1-3. In Block 1, participants completed 20 
trials practicing the categorization of pictures of 10 
White and 10 Black people (five male and five female 
each) using the I and E keys on their computer 
keyboards. In Block 2, they completed 20 trials 
practicing the categorization of positive and negative 
words using the same keys. Blocks 3 and 4 consisted of 
20 and then 40 trials in which participants responded to 
pictures and words using either a prejudice-compatible 
or a prejudice-incompatible key mapping. In Block 5, 
participants practiced the categorization of positive and 
negative words on 40 trials using a reversed key mapping 
compared to Block 1. In Blocks 6 and 7, participants 
completed 20 and then 40 trials categorizing pictures and 
words with key mappings that were reversed in 
comparison with Blocks 3 and 4 (prejudice-incompatible 
or prejudice-compatible). The order of the combined 
blocks (compatible first vs. incompatible first) and key 
mappings for Black and White participants (White-left 
and Black-right vs. Black-left and White-right) were 
reading this question carefully, please press 2, and This is an attention 
check. If you are reading this statement, click option 6. 
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counterbalanced across participants. When participants 
made an error, they were asked to correct their responses 
by pressing the other button. Response times were 
recorded from stimulus onset until participants provided 
the correct response (see Greenwald et al., 2003). 
Following standard conventions (Greenwald et al., 
2003), IAT D scores were computed by calculating the 
differences between reaction times on one incompatible 
and one compatible block for each participant and 
dividing them by the pooled standard deviations of those 
two blocks. This was done once for Blocks 3 and 6, and 
once for Blocks 4 and 7. The final D score reflects the 
average of those two scores. The IAT showed 
satisfactory reliability (Cronbach’s α = .79).15 
Acknowledgement of bias. Participants completed 
an eight-item acknowledgement of bias (AoB) scale 
created for the purpose of the current studies. The scale 
was designed to capture participants’ self-assessment of 
their automatic racial biases, using the automaticity 
features of unintentionality, efficiency, and 
uncontrollability (see Bargh, 1994). Because Hahn et 
al.’s (2014) findings indicate that people can predict their 
IAT scores with high degree of accuracy, we did not 
include the automaticity feature of unawareness (e.g., 
“unconscious”) in the scale. The items of the AoB scale 
are presented in Appendix A.16 Responses were 
measured on 7-point rating scales ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) using 
individually randomized orders for each participant. 
Negatively framed items were reverse coded, such that 
higher numbers on aggregate scores of the AoB scale 
reflect greater acknowledgement of bias (Cronbach’s α 
= .95).  
Procedure. After providing informed consent, 
participants completed the non-prejudicial goals scale. 
Next, half of the participants predicted their IAT scores, 
whereas the other half completed the filler task. Next, 
half of the participants completed the Black-White IAT 
before completing the AoB scale, whereas the other half 
completed the AoB scale and then the Black-White IAT. 
The study concluded with the measurement of 
demographic information. 
Results 
Prediction accuracy. In Hahn et al.’s (2014) 
research, accuracy was relatively high for the prediction 
of individual patterns of group preferences (e.g., stronger 
bias against one target group compared to another target 
group), but lower for the prediction of a given group 
                                                 
15 We calculated the reliability using the shinyapp tool offered by the 
IATgen webpage at https://applibs.shinyapps.io/iatui2/. It calculates a 
split-half reliability, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula, 
equivalent to a Cronbach’s α value based on two individual items.  
16 The items were chosen on the basis of a pilot study in which 119 
participants rated their agreement with 13 potential test items. All 13 
preference compared to other participants (e.g., stronger 
bias against a given target group compared other 
participants). Whereas the former finding was reflected 
in relatively large within-subjects correlations between 
predicted and actual IAT scores (i.e., high accuracy in 
predicting one’s patterns of IAT scores in a set of five 
IATs), the latter findings was reflected in medium-size 
between-subjects correlations between predicted and 
actual IAT scores (i.e., moderate accuracy in how well 
participants’ predictions reflected how they would score 
on a given IAT compares to the IAT scores of other 
participants in the sample). Because the current study 
included only one IAT, prediction accuracy can be 
assessed only in terms of between-subjects correlations, 
but not in terms of within-subjects correlations. 
Controlling for the counterbalancing of IAT block order 
and key mapping, the standardized relationship between 
predicted and actual IAT scores was r = .28 (CI95% [.14; 
.43]), comparable to the medium-size between-subjects 
correlations reported by Hahn et al. (2014). 
IAT scores. A 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 (IAT 
Completion) ANOVA on IAT scores did not reveal any 
significant main or interaction effects, all Fs < 0.50, all 
ps > .48, suggesting that IAT scores were unaffected by 
the prediction task and the order in which participants 
completed the IAT and the AoB scale. 
Acknowledgement of bias. Submitted to a 2 (IAT 
Score Prediction) × 2 (IAT Completion) ANOVA, AoB 
scores showed a significant main effect of IAT Score 
Prediction, F(1, 354) = 14.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .039. 
Consistent with the results of Studies 1-3, participants 
who predicted their IAT scores showed greater 
acknowledgement of bias than participants who did not 
predict their IAT scores (see Figure 5). There was no 
significant main effect of IAT Completion, F(1, 354) = 
1.79, p = .18, ηp2 = .005, and no significant interaction of 
IAT Score Prediction and IAT Completion, F(1, 354) = 
0.00, p = .99, ηp2 = .000. 
Non-prejudicial goals. To investigate whether the 
effect of IAT Score Prediction depends on non-
prejudicial goals, we regressed AoB scores onto a 
contrast-coded predictor of the IAT score prediction 
manipulation (-1 = no prediction, 1 = prediction), a 
contrast-coded predictor of the IAT completion 
manipulation (-1 = no IAT, 1 = IAT), z-standardized 
scores of the non-prejudicial goals scale, as well as all 
interactions between these three predictors. In addition 
to replicating the main effect of IAT Score Prediction, b 
= .29, SE = .074, t(350) = 3.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .042, the 
items loaded >.65 on the same first principal component in a principal 
component analysis, a scree plot also suggested one factor, and this 
first factor explained 71% of the variance. For the sake of brevity, we 
selected 8 items that provided a good mix of positively and negatively 
framed items and could be applied flexibly without reference to 
particular racial groups. 
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analysis revealed a significant main effect of non-
prejudicial goals, b = -.21, SE = .074, t(350) = -2.90, p = 
.004, ηp2=.023, and a significant interaction of the two 
predictors, b = .16, SE = .074, t(350) = 2.22, p = .027, ηp2 
= .014. As shown in Figure 6, only participants who 
scored high on non-prejudicial goals showed greater 
acknowledgement of bias after predicting IAT scores, 
F(1, 350) = 18.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .051. There was no 
effect of the prediction task for participants who scored 
low on non-prejudicial goals, F(1, 350) = 1.46, p = .228, 
ηp2 = .004.  
Discussion 
In contrast with the outcome measures in Studies 1-
3, participants in Study 4 were asked to directly rate the 
extent to which they harbor racial biases after the 
manipulation of IAT score prediction. Results confirmed 
our proposed interpretation that increased explicit biases 
and greater alignment between explicit and implicit 
preferences reflect increased acknowledgement of bias: 
Participants who predicted their IAT scores later rated 
themselves as being more biased compared to 
participants who did not predict their IAT scores. 
Moreover, effects of IAT score prediction depended on 
non-prejudicial goals, in that the prediction task 
increased acknowledgement of bias more for 
participants with strong non-prejudicial goals, but not for 
participants with weak non-prejudicial goals. IAT 
completion did not have any significant effects on self-
reported acknowledgement of bias. Another noteworthy 
aspect of Study 4 is that it replicated the findings of 
Studies 1-3 in a more economical online design using a 
single standard IAT (instead of five shortened IATs). 
This simplified design not only supports the reliability of 
the obtained effects of IAT score prediction; it also 
provides a more viable design for potential interventions.  
Study 5 
Study 5 had three goals. One was to replicate the 
findings of Study 4 without measuring non-prejudicial 
goals at the beginning of the study. Our reasoning was 
that completion of the non-prejudicial goals scale could 
potentially increase the salience of those goals and thus 
distort effects of IAT score prediction and IAT 
completion. Hence, participants in Study 5 went through 
the same procedure as participants in Study 4 the only 
difference being that they did not complete the non-
prejudicial goals scale. A second goal was to examine 
the effect of IAT feedback on acknowledgement of bias. 
Although Study 3 suggests that IAT feedback does not 
increase overall levels of explicit biases and the 
alignment between explicit and implicit preferences, we 
aimed to confirm whether this finding generalizes to a 
direct measure of acknowledgement of bias. Finally, a 
third goal was to address a minor programming error in 
Study 4. Different from the typical IAT procedure in 
which the key assignment for the target groups (Black 
vs. White) is reversed in the second set of combined 
blocks (Greenwald et al., 1998), the IAT in Study 4 was 
programmed such that the key assignment of the 
evaluative attributes (good vs. bad) was reversed. This 
programming error was fixed in Study 5.  
Method 
Participants and design. The study included a 2 
(IAT Score Prediction: prediction vs. no prediction) × 3 
(IAT Completion: not completed vs. completed without 
feedback vs. completed with feedback) between-subjects 
design. Based on the effect sizes in Study 4, a sample 
size of N = 260 provides a power of 90% to replicate the 
effect of IAT score prediction on acknowledgement of 
bias. In Study 5, we aimed for a slightly larger sample 
(1) to compensate for potential overestimations of the 
obtained effect sizes, (2) to have enough participants per 
cell with the addition of the two feedback conditions, (3) 
to have sufficient power to obtain potentially smaller 
interaction effects, and (4) to have enough participants 
after excluding fast responders on the IAT. Based on 
these considerations, we aimed to recruit 480 
participants (80 per cell) via TurkPrime in compensation 
for US-$ 1. Out of 527 participants who initially began 
completing the study, 484 completed all components. 
Data from 35 participants were excluded from analyses. 
For two participants no IAT data were stored; eight 
participants failed the attention check item embedded in 
the AoB scale, and 25 participants responded in less than 
300 ms to more than 10% of the trials on the IAT. Of the 
remaining 449 participants (51.2% female, median age = 
33 years, age range = 18-76 years,), 71.9% identified as 
White, 7.3% as Black, 6.2% as Latino, 7.3% as Asian, 
and the remaining 7.1% as another ethnicity or as several 
ethnicities.  
Measures. The measures and materials were 
identical to those in Study 4, except for some minor 
changes in the IAT. First, we corrected the programming 
error in Study 4, such that the key assignment for the two 
target groups (rather than the evaluative attributes) was 
reversed in the second set of combined blocks 
(Greenwald et al., 1998). Second, we altered the 
JavaScript codes from IATgen (Carpenter et al., 2017) to 
automatically calculate an IAT D score (Greenwald et 
al., 2003). For one third of the participants, the calculated 
D scores were translated into a feedback statement using 
the same cut-offs and wording as in Study 3 and on the 
IAT webpage. Reliability was satisfactory for the IAT 
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(Cronbach’s α = .67)17 as well as the AoB scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .94). 
Procedure. After participants provided informed 
consent, roughly half completed the IAT score prediction 
task and the other half completed the filler task. Next, 
roughly one third of participants completed the IAT 
without feedback and one third with feedback. Both of 
these groups completed the AoB after completing the 
IAT. The remaining third completed the AoB scale and 
then the IAT. The study concluded with questions about 
demographic information. 
Results 
Prediction accuracy. Controlling for IAT block 
order and key assignment, the standardized between-
subjects relationship between predicted and actual IAT 
scores was r = .33 (CI95% [.20; .45]), slightly higher than 
in Study 2, but again comparable to the between-subjects 
correlations reported by Hahn et al. (2014). 
IAT scores. A 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 3 (IAT 
Completion) ANOVA on IAT scores did not reveal any 
significant main or interaction effects of the 
experimental conditions, all Fs < 1.30, all ps > .29, 
suggesting that IAT scores were unaffected by the two 
manipulations. 
Acknowledgement of bias. A 2 (IAT Score 
Prediction) × 3 (IAT Completion) ANOVA on AoB 
scores revealed a significant main effect of IAT Score 
Prediction, F(1, 443) = 8.08, p = .005, ηp2 = .018. 
Replicating the findings of Study 4, acknowledgement of 
bias was greater when participants predicted their IAT 
scores than when they did not predict their IAT scores 
(see Figure 7). This main effect was qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction between IAT Score 
Prediction and IAT Completion, F(2, 443) = 3.12, p = 
.045, ηp2 = .014. Inspection of this interaction revealed 
that IAT Completion influenced AoB scores in the no-
prediction condition, F(2, 443) = 3.97, p = .018, 
ηp2=.018, but not in the prediction condition, F(2, 443) = 
.30, p = .74, ηp2 = .001 (see Figure 7). Simple-effect 
contrasts further showed that, among participants who 
had not predicted their IAT scores, those who completed 
the IAT with feedback showed significantly higher AoB 
scores than those who had not completed the IAT, t(443) 
= 2.81, p =.005, ηp2 = .017. Participants in the no-
prediction condition who had completed the IAT without 
feedback showed AoB scores in-between the two 
groups, differing neither from participants in the no-
completion condition, t(443) = 1.63, p = .104, ηp2 = .006, 
nor from participants in the IAT with feedback 
condition, t(443) = 1.23, p = .218, ηp2 = .003. The 
interaction was also evident in that the effect of 
                                                 
17 Reliability was again calculated as a Cronbach’s α value of the two 
separate D scores (i.e., their correlation corrected by the Spearman-
Brown formula). 
prediction on acknowledgement was significant in the 
no-IAT condition, t(443) = 3.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .028, but 
not in the IAT plus feedback condition, t(443) = .09, p = 
.930, ηp2 = .000. An interaction of a specific contrast 
comparing those two conditions with the prediction 
manipulation was significant, t(443) = -2.45, p =.015, ηp2 
= .013. The effect of prediction was not significant in the 
IAT without feedback condition, t(443) = 1.28, p = .203, 
ηp2 = .004, although interaction effects with more 
specific contrasts revealed that it was neither 
significantly smaller than the effect in the no-IAT 
condition, t(443) = -1.64, p = .102, ηp2 = .006, nor 
significantly bigger than in the IAT with feedback 
condition, t(443) = -.83, p =.407, ηp2 = .002. 
Effects of feedback. To investigate whether the 
extremity of feedback influenced acknowledgement of 
bias among the 146 participants in the feedback 
condition, we created a continuous measure of the verbal 
feedback in absolute terms (from 0, little to no automatic 
preference, to 3, strong automatic preference). We then 
regressed AoB scores onto z-standardized measure of 
this score, a contrast comparing the prediction (coded 1) 
with the no-prediction condition (coded -1), and their 
interaction. Results revealed no significant relationship 
between feedback and AoB scores, and the size of the 
slope suggested, if anything, a negative relationship, b = 
-.08, SE = .112, t(142) = -.71, p = .479. The lack of a 
significant interaction revealed that this was true for both 
the predictions and the no-predictions conditions, b = 
.03, SE = .112, t(142) = .22, p = .826. 
Following the analyses in Study 3, we also created a 
discrepancy score for the 73 participants who predicted 
their scores and received feedback between their 
absolute feedback scores and their absolute prediction 
scores. Surprisingly, the discrepancy between 
predictions and feedback was significantly negatively 
related to acknowledgement of bias, b = -.27, SE = .114, 
t(71) = -2.33, p = .023, standardized relationship: r = -
.27. Hence, the more negative participants’ feedback was 
compared to their predictions, the less they agreed with 
items describing them as biased, reminiscent of Howell 
and colleagues’ findings on defensive responding to IAT 
feedback (Howell et al., 2015; Howell & Ratliff, 2017). 
Thus, although IAT completion with feedback led to an 
overall increase in acknowledgement of bias when 
participants did not predict IAT scores, 
acknowledgement of bias was unrelated to the individual 
feedback participants received, and it was related to 
reduced acknowledgement when it exceeded 
participants’ expectations in the prediction condition.  
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Discussion 
In Study 5, participants went through the same 
procedure as participants in Study 4, one important 
difference being that they did not complete a measure of 
non-prejudicial goals prior to the manipulation of IAT 
score prediction. Despite this procedural difference, IAT 
score prediction increased acknowledgement of bias, 
replicating the main finding of Study 4. IAT completion 
without feedback had no significant effect on 
acknowledgement of bias, again replicating the results of 
Study 4. Yet, different from the findings in Study 3 
where IAT completion with feedback had no effect on 
size of explicit preferences, IAT completion with 
feedback increased acknowledgment of bias in the 
current study. However, this increase was unrelated to 
the individual feedback participants received on their 
IAT performance, and it was related to reduced 
acknowledgement to the degree that it contradicted 
participants’ expectations for how much bias they would 
show. This suggests that those who would have the most 
to learn from receiving IAT feedback would be least 
likely to accept it. 
Study 6 
Studies 1-5 suggest that predicting one’s IAT scores 
can increase acknowledgement of bias. This was 
reflected in (1) increased alignment between explicit and 
implicit preferences, (2) greater levels of explicit biases, 
and (3) enhanced self-reports of harboring racial biases. 
These findings are consistent with the idea that IAT 
score prediction enhances attention to one’s spontaneous 
affective reactions toward minority members, which 
increases acknowledgement of bias by making those 
reactions more salient and counteracting their dismissal. 
However, it is also compatible with an interpretation 
suggesting that anticipating the completion of a 
psychological test that will uncover one’s biases 
increases people’s willingness to admit these biases. In 
the current studies, participants who were asked to 
predict their IAT scores were also told that they would 
later complete the IATs for which they were asked to 
predict their scores, and this announcement may be a 
necessary ingredient for the effectiveness of the 
procedure.  
The main goal of Study 6 was to address this 
confound. Toward this end, we asked one group of 
participants to predict their IAT scores as in all previous 
studies (prediction condition). Another group of 
participants was asked to attend to their spontaneous 
affective reactions toward minority groups without 
asking them to make any predictions, and without 
reference to any of the terminology used in discussions 
surrounding implicit bias (e.g. “unconscious” or 
“implicit”, attention condition). We then compared 
acknowledgement of bias among participants in the two 
conditions to each other as well as to a third group of 
participants who was neither asked to predict IAT scores 
nor asked to attend to spontaneous affective reactions 
(control condition). To the extent that the findings in 
Studies 1-5 can be explained by enhanced attention to 
spontaneous affective reactions during the prediction 
task alone (and not by test announcement), 
acknowledgement of bias should be greater in both the 
prediction and the attention conditions compared to the 
control condition. Yet, if anticipation of a psychological 
test that will reveal one’s personal biases is a necessary 
component of the acknowledgement of bias effects 
observed in Studies 1-5, acknowledgement of bias 
should be higher in the predictions as opposed to both 
the attention and the control conditions. 
Method 
Participants and design. The study used a one-
factorial design with three between-subjects conditions: 
(1) IAT Score Prediction, (2) Attention to Spontaneous 
Affective Reactions, and (3) Control Condition. Power 
analyses suggested a sample of 260 participants to 
provide a probability of 90% to replicate the significant 
effect of IAT Score Prediction in Study 4, and a sample 
of 365 to replicate the simple effect of IAT Score 
Prediction in the no-completion condition of Study 5. 
Based on these estimations and anticipated exclusions, 
we aimed to recruit 390 participants (130 per condition) 
on TurkPrime for a compensation of US-$ 0.50. Out of 
402 participants who started completing the study, 392 
completed all measures. Of these participants, nine failed 
the attention check item and were therefore excluded 
from analyses. Of the remaining 383 participants (50.9% 
female, median age = 33 years, age range 18-74 years), 
79.9% identified as White, 5.7% as Black, 4.2% as 
Latino, 4.2% as Asian, and the remaining 6% as another 
ethnicity or several ethnic backgrounds. 
Materials and procedure. After providing 
informed consent, participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the three experimental conditions. Participants 
in the current study did not complete any IATs. Materials 
in the IAT score prediction condition and the control 
condition were similar to those of Studies 4 and 5. 
Participants in the prediction condition completed the 
IAT score prediction task and participants in the control 
condition completed the consumer preference task. 
Participants in the attention condition received the 
following instructions: 
Psychologists have long been interested in people’s 
spontaneous reactions towards different people. That is, 
in addition to the things you say when you are asked 
about your attitudes, you may have spontaneous 
reactions towards people at first that you wouldn’t 
always express. For instance, you may have a more 
positive affective reaction towards a picture of a skinny 
top model than towards a picture of a regular woman, 
even though you may not think or say that skinny top 
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models are better people than regular women. In this 
study, we are interested in your first reactions. In a 
minute, you will see pictures of people and we want to 
know what your first reaction is, independent of what you 
would say once you have had time to reflect about your 
opinion. Please be honest and take your time to observe 
how you feel in the first second when you look at the 
pictures. 
As in the prediction condition, participants then 
provided a “test indication” about their reactions to cats 
and dogs, introduced as follows: 
Before you report your spontaneous reactions towards 
different social groups, we would like you to get used to 
the scales you will use to report those reactions. 
Remember that your first reaction could be different 
from a general opinion you may have. And right now, we 
are only interested in your first reaction. 
The scales included the same pictures of Black and 
White people formatted in the same way as in the 
prediction manipulation. A text encouraged participants 
to look at the pictures and pay attention to their 
immediate spontaneous reactions. They were then asked 
to complete the sentence My spontaneous reaction to 
BLACK vs. WHITE is… by checking one response option 
on a 7-point rating scale ranging from -3 (a lot more 
positive toward BLACK) to +3 (a lot more positive 
toward WHITE). Hence, in addition to not announcing 
measurement, the attention manipulation also never 
mentioned the word “implicit” in any combination to 
avoid that participants would draw connections to 
discussions surrounding implicit bias and anticipate a 
test. After completing either the prediction, the attention, 
or the filler task, participants completed the AoB scale 
(Cronbach’s α = .96), provided demographic 
information, and were then debriefed, including 
information that they would not in fact be asked to 
complete IATs in this study (despite the announcement 
in the prediction condition) and the reason for this 
deception, but could do so at the website of project 
implicit (http://implicit.harvard.edu). 
Results 
Participants reported similar levels of pro-White 
bias when they reported their spontaneous affective 
reactions (M = .95, SD = 1.28) and when they predicted 
IAT scores (M = .73, SD = 1.47). Both of these scores 
differed significantly from a no-bias score of 0, 
Attention: t(131) = 8.55, p < .001, d = .74, Prediction: 
t(121) = 5.50, p < .001, d = .50, but they did not 
significantly differ from each other, t(252) = -1.30, p = 
.193, d = -.16.  
A one-way ANOVA on AoB scores further revealed 
a significant difference between experimental 
conditions, F(2, 380) = 15.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .073 (see 
Figure 8). Simple-effect contrasts revealed that 
participants who predicted their IAT scores showed 
greater acknowledgement of bias than participants in the 
control condition, F(1, 380) = 15.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .040. 
Similarly, participants who were asked to pay attention 
to their spontaneous affective reactions showed greater 
acknowledgement of bias than participants in the control 
condition, F(1, 380) = 27.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .068. 
Participants in the attention condition did not differ from 
participants in the prediction condition, F(1, 380) = 1.45, 
p = .230, ηp2 = .004. Hence, there was no evidence that 
attention without test announcement had weaker effects 
than predicting IAT scores; the means, if anything, 
suggested an opposite pattern. 
Discussion 
The main goal of Study 6 was to provide more 
compelling evidence for the hypothesis that IAT score 
prediction increases acknowledgement of bias via 
enhanced attention to spontaneous affective reactions 
toward minority group members. Toward this end, we 
compared the prediction manipulation utilized in Studies 
1-5 to a condition where participants were asked to pay 
attention to their spontaneous reactions without any 
reference to a psychological test or constructs used in 
discussions surrounding implicit bias. Consistent with 
the hypothesis that the findings in Studies 1-5 are driven 
by enhanced attention to spontaneous affective reactions 
during the prediction task, and not by anticipation of a 
test that will reveal one’s biases, acknowledgement of 
bias was greater in both the attention and the prediction 
conditions compared to the control condition, and even 
non-significantly larger in the attention condition. These 
findings rule out an interpretation suggesting that 
anticipation of a psychological bias test that will 
encourage admission of bias is a necessary component 
for the effects observed in Studies 1-5.  
General Discussion 
Expanding on conflicting conceptions of implicit 
bias, the current research investigated the effectiveness 
of different procedures to increase acknowledgement of 
harboring biases against minorities, focusing particularly 
on the effects of predicting one’s IAT scores. Studies 1-
3 showed that participants who predicted their responses 
towards various minority groups on future IATs showed 
increased alignment between implicit and explicit 
preferences and greater explicit bias against minorities. 
Expanding on these findings, Studies 4-6 demonstrated 
that participants who predicted their racial bias on a 
Black-White IAT later described themselves as 
harboring greater levels of automatic racial bias. Study 4 
further showed that the effect of IAT score prediction 
depends on the endorsement of non-prejudicial goals, in 
that the effects of IAT score prediction on 
acknowledgement of bias were larger for participants 
with strong non-prejudicial goals, but diminished for 
participants with weak non-prejudicial goals. Finally, 
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Study 6 showed that instructions to attend to one’s 
spontaneous affective reactions toward minority 
members increased acknowledgement of bias to the 
same extent as IAT score prediction. 
Completion of IATs with and without feedback had 
inconsistent effects across studies and criterion 
measures. Although IAT completion without feedback 
marginally increased alignment between implicit and 
explicit bias against minorities in Study 2 and 3, this 
effect was non-significant in Study 1. It further never led 
to an increase in explicit bias (and to a decrease in bias 
in Studies 1 and 2), and it never showed significant 
effects on self-reported acknowledgement of bias. IAT 
completion with feedback may have increased the 
alignment between implicit and explicit preferences in 
Study 3 (there was no simple alignment effect in the 
feedback condition, but an interaction indicating that 
alignment was larger than in the control condition), but 
it did not lead to an increase in reported bias either. It 
further did lead to an increase in self-reported 
acknowledgement of bias (Study 5), but this increase 
was unrelated to the content of the individual feedback; 
and acknowledgement was negatively related to the 
content of the feedback to the extent that it exceeded 
participants’ predictions.  
Together, these results suggest that 
acknowledgement of bias can be increased by directing 
people’s attention to their spontaneous affective 
reactions toward minority groups (e.g., by asking them 
to predict their scores on future IATs). Effects of IAT 
completion and IAT feedback on acknowledgement of 
bias were inconsistent and less reliable. 
Theoretical Implications  
A popular explanation for differences between 
implicit and explicit evaluations is that implicit 
evaluations reflect attitudes people are unable report 
(e.g., https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education. 
html). According to this view, people have no 
introspective access to the attitudes underlying their 
implicit biases, which makes them unable to report these 
attitudes on traditional self-report measures (for 
perspectives challenging this view, see Gawronski et al., 
2006; Hahn & Gawronski, 2014: Hahn et al., 2014). 
Based on this conception, one potential way to increase 
acknowledgement of bias is to inform people about their 
implicit biases by providing individual feedback on their 
IAT scores. This hypothesis is consistent with the 
finding that IAT feedback increased self-reported 
acknowledgement of bias (Study 5). However, it is 
challenged by the findings that (1) the obtained increase 
in acknowledgement of bias was unrelated to the 
individual feedback participants received on their IAT 
performance and negatively related to acknowledgement 
to the degree that it exceeded participants’ performance 
expectations (Study 5), and (2) IAT feedback had no 
effect on overall levels of explicit bias (Study 3). 
Another popular explanation for differences 
between implicit and explicit evaluations is that implicit 
evaluations reflect attitudes people are unwilling report 
(e.g., https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education. 
html). This conception is based on the idea that responses 
on traditional self-report measures are much easier to 
control than responses on performance-based measures. 
Hence, honest reporting of one’s biases on self-report 
measures can be undermined by social desirability and 
other self-presentational concerns (for a critical review, 
see Gawronski et al., 2007). From this perspective, one 
potential way to increase acknowledgement of bias is tell 
participants that their personal biases will be identified 
with a performance-based measure that cannot be 
controlled, as this may encourage them to be more 
willing to admit to their biases (e.g., Nier, 2005). And 
this increase in admission of bias may occur without 
actual completion of an implicit bias test or individual 
feedback on one’s measurement scores. Because the IAT 
score prediction task in Studies 1-5 informed participants 
about the completion of future IATs, this hypothesis is 
consistent with the findings that alignment between 
implicit and explicit preferences, overall levels of 
explicit bias, and self-reported acknowledgement of bias 
were greater when participants were asked to predict 
their IAT scores. It is also consistent with the finding that 
IAT completion alone, compared to a control condition 
that does not announce a test, did lead to a marginal 
alignment of explicit and implicit evaluations in Studies 
2 and 3. However, it is inconsistent with the finding that 
IAT completion alone did not lead to acknowledgement 
of bias (Studies 4-6) or larger explicit bias (Studies 1-3). 
Most importantly, Study 6 showed that anticipation of a 
psychological bias test does not seem to be a necessary 
component of the effects of predicting one’s IAT scores. 
Participants who were simply asked to report their 
spontaneous affective reactions towards a set of pictures 
showed that same acknowledgement effect as a group of 
participants who predicted their IAT scores towards 
those pictures.  
A third possibility is that people can become aware 
of the unconscious attitudes underlying their implicit 
biases by observing behavioral effects of their 
unconscious attitudes (Hofmann et al., 2009; Hofmann 
& Wilson, 2010). Because participants typically notice 
the difference in their reaction times and errors in the 
prejudice-congruent and prejudice-incongruent blocks 
of the IAT (Monteith et al., 2001), mere completion of 
an IAT may increase acknowledgement of bias to the 
extent that participants notice the behavioral effects of 
their attitudes in the task. Different from the hypothesis 
that people are generally unable to report their implicit 
biases, the notion of self-perception (Bem, 1972) 
suggests that merely completing an IAT may increase 
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acknowledgement of bias by observing one’s behavior 
even without feedback about one’s measurement scores. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the finding that IAT 
completion without feedback marginally increased 
alignment of implicit and explicit evaluations in Studies 
2 and 3. However, in addition to this effect being only 
marginal in Studies 2 and 3, it was non-significant in 
Study 1. Moreover, IAT completion without feedback 
did not increase overall explicit bias (Studies 1-3) and it 
did not increase self-reported acknowledgement of bias 
(Studies 4-5). Thus, even if IAT completion can 
contribute to increased acknowledgement of bias via 
self-perception, such effects seem to be small and 
unreliable, and inconsistent across outcome measures.  
Finally, a fourth conception suggests that implicit 
evaluations are subjectively experienced as spontaneous 
affective reactions, and dissociations between implicit 
and explicit evaluations arise from differences in the 
extent to which people rely on their spontaneous 
affective reactions in making an evaluative judgment 
(Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). 
Thus, to the extent that people do not base their overt 
judgements on spontaneous affective reactions, they may 
dismiss the significance of these reactions in producing 
discriminatory behavior. From this perspective, directing 
people’s attention to their spontaneous affective 
reactions toward minority members may increase 
acknowledgement of bias by counteracting the dismissal 
of these reactions. To the extent that prediction of IAT 
scores enhances such attention, acknowledgement of 
bias could be increased by asking participants to predict 
their IAT scores without requiring them to complete an 
IAT, without feedback on their measurement scores, and 
without anticipation of actual measurement. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the finding that IAT score 
prediction consistently led to acknowledgement on all 
three criterion measures. It led to increased alignment 
between implicit and explicit preferences (Studies 1-3), 
greater levels of explicit bias (Studies 1-3), and increased 
self-reported acknowledgement of being racially biased 
(Studies 4-6). Moreover, instructions to attend to one’s 
spontaneous affective reactions toward minority 
members increased acknowledgement of bias to the 
same extent as IAT score prediction (Study 6), providing 
further evidence for the functional equivalence of IAT 
score prediction and attention to spontaneous affective 
reactions.  
Implications for Interventions  
The IAT has become a popular “consciousness 
raising” tool in educational settings (Casad et al., 2013; 
Hillard, et al. 2013) and the popular media (“Dateline 
NBC”, 2007; “This American Life”, 2015), even 
reaching into debates on policy applications 
(Hillaryclinton.com, 2016; Reuters, 2016). Many of 
these trainings and exercises involve the completion of 
IATs, feedback on IAT performance, information on the 
meaning of the implicit bias construct, and extensive 
discussions about participants’ personal biases (e.g., 
Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012; Forscher, 
Mitamura, Dix, Cox, & Devine, 2017). By dissociating 
these aspects experimentally, the current studies showed 
that the discussion part might be the more effective 
ingredient in such interventions compared to IAT 
completion and IAT feedback. In the current studies, 
directing participants’ attention to their spontaneous 
affective reactions by asking them to predict their scores 
on future IATs led to increased alignment between 
implicit and explicit preferences, greater levels of 
explicit bias, and greater acknowledgement of personal 
bias. IAT completion and IAT feedback showed 
inconsistent effects across studies and outcome 
measures. 
Note, however, that the current findings do not 
provide any information on the temporal persistence of 
the obtained effects, which remains an important 
question for future research. Neither do they speak to the 
question of whether increased acknowledgement of bias 
is beneficial for intergroup relations. Such benefits are 
often taken for granted and extant theories persuasively 
argue that acknowledgement of bias may be an important 
first step in counteracting prejudice and discrimination 
(e.g., Monteith & Mark, 2005). However, several 
additional factors may have to be considered to 
understand the downstream effects of increased 
acknowledgement of bias. In the exploratory analyses 
reported in Supplemental Materials Section A, we 
investigated downstream effects on internal and external 
motivation to respond without prejudice (Plant & 
Devine, 1998). Although these analyses suggest that IAT 
score prediction increases the motivation to respond 
without prejudice, this effect was eliminated when 
participants completed IATs in addition to predicting 
their IAT scores. These exploratory results suggest that 
the downstream effects of increased acknowledgement 
of bias on motivation to counteract bias may be more 
complex and dependent on other factors. Nevertheless, 
our findings suggest that one particularly effective way 
of increasing acknowledgement of bias is to direct 
people’s attention to their spontaneous affective 
reactions towards minority groups. More research is 
needed to elucidate whether or not such 
acknowledgement is a beneficial strategy for 
interventions against discrimination and inequality at the 
societal level. 
Conclusion 
Implicit biases are often presented as attitudes 
people are unable or unwilling to report (e.g., 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html). 
Sometimes, these attitudes are described as unconscious 
(e.g., Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Phelps et al., 
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2000), suggesting that conscious awareness of the 
attitudes underlying implicit biases is impossible (e.g., 
Devos, 2008; Kassin, Fein, & Markus, 2001; Kihlstrom, 
2004; McConnell, Dunn, Austin, & Rawn, 2011). Based 
on these assumptions, it seems quite remarkable that 
people can predict their IAT with a high level of 
accuracy (Hahn et al., 2014) and predicting one’s IAT 
scores increases (1) the alignment between implicit and 
explicit preferences, (2) overall levels of explicit bias, 
and (3) self-reported acknowledgement of harboring 
automatic biases. In light of conceptions that assume that 
people would be unwilling to admit to their biases, it is 
equally remarkable that a simple instruction to direct 
one’s attention to pictures of Whites and minorities, 
without any announcement of test completion, also led 
to acknowledgement of bias.  
Importantly, however, these findings are consistent 
with extant theories suggesting that implicit evaluations 
are subjectively experienced as spontaneous affective 
reactions (e.g., Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006, 2011). According to these theories, predicting 
one’s IAT scores may increase attention to one’s 
spontaneous affective reaction, which may counteract 
the dismissal of these reactions in producing 
discriminatory behavior. Based on these conclusions, we 
deem it problematic to present implicit biases as attitudes 
that people are either unable or unwilling to report. Aside 
from being difficult to reconcile with the available 
evidence, such conceptualizations may thwart the path to 
implementing effective ways of educating the public 
about effective ways to foster acknowledgement of 
personal biases. The current findings suggest that a 
presentation of implicit biases as spontaneous affective 
reactions may be more accurate, opening the door for the 
development of more effective bias interventions. As we 
noted above, whether or not acknowledgement of bias 
also leads to increased efforts to control one’s biases is a 
question awaiting future research. However, informed 
debates about bias intervention require that we accept 
and publicly communicate the fact that differences 
between implicit and explicit preferences are rooted in 
factors that have little to do with lack of awareness or 
dishonest self-reports. 
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Table 1. Feeling thermometer preferences at Time-2 regressed simultaneously onto IAT scores and 
feeling thermometer preferences at Time-1 (Level-1) as a function of IAT score prediction and IAT 
completion (Level-2), Study 1. 
Parameters (DV: Thermometer Ratings Time-2) Slope Estimates  (Standard Errors) 
Fixed effects  
 Thermometer Ratings Time-1 .73 *** .030 
 Therm. Time-1*IAT completion -.05 † .030 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction -.12 *** .030 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction*IAT completion .01 .030 
 IAT Scores .15 *** .026 
 IAT Scores*IAT completion .03 .026 
 IAT Scores*Prediction .13 *** .026 
 IAT Scores*Prediction*IAT completion .01 .026 
Random effect variances  
 Thermometer ratings Time-1 .075 *** (.017) 
 IAT scores .037 ** (.012) 
 Residuals .211 *** (.014) 
Goodness of fit  
 -2 log likelihood 1198.80 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, †p = .087. Level-1 variables and IAT scores were standardized for each 
individual participant before they were entered in the analysis. Hence, all individual mean values are 0 
and no intercept and no Level-1 main effects can be estimated. The prediction manipulation is coded “-1” 
for no predictions and “1” for predictions; IAT completion is coded “-1” when no IATs completed before 
Time-2 ratings, and “1” when all IATs were completed before Time-2 ratings.  
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Table 2. Simple slope estimates and standard errors of average simultaneous within-subject effect of IAT 
scores and Time-1 feeling thermometer preferences in the prediction of Time-2 feeling thermometer 
preferences as a function of IAT Score Prediction and IAT Completion (N = 150), Study 1. 
 
 
IATs  
Completed 
No IATs  
Completed 
 
IAT Score 
Prediction 
Thermometer preferences Time-1 .57*** (.061) .66*** (.060) 
IAT scores .31*** (.053) .23*** (.051) 
No IAT 
Score 
Prediction 
Thermometer preferences Time-1 .79*** (.062) .91*** (.060) 
IAT scores .04       (.053) .00        (.052) 
Note. ***p < .001. Scores were standardized for each participant before they were entered into the multi-
level analyses. Values can be interpreted similarly to semipartial correlation coefficients.  
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Table 3. Feeling thermometer preferences at Time-2 regressed simultaneously onto IAT scores and 
feeling thermometer preferences at Time-1 (Level-1) as a function of IAT score prediction and IAT 
completion (Level-2), Study 2. 
Parameters (DV: Thermometer Ratings Time-2) Slope Estimates (Standard Errors) 
Fixed effects  
 Thermometer Ratings Time-1 .80 *** (.021) 
 Therm. Time-1*IAT completion -.03 (.021) 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction -.05 * (.021) 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction*IAT completion .04 * (.021) 
 IAT Scores .11 *** (.020) 
 IAT Scores*IAT completion .04 † (.020) 
 IAT Scores*Prediction .09 *** (.020) 
 IAT Scores*Prediction*IAT completion -.01 (.020) 
Random effect variances  
 Thermometer ratings Time-1 .028 ** (.009) 
 IAT scores .023 ** (.008) 
 Residuals .182 *** (.011) 
Goodness of fit  
 -2 log likelihood 1296.98 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, †p = .062. Level-1 variables and IAT scores were standardized for 
each individual participant before they were entered in the analysis. Hence, all individual mean values are 
0 and no intercept and no Level-1 main effects can be estimated. The prediction manipulation is coded “-
1” for no predictions and “1” for predictions; IAT completion is coded “-1” when no IATs completed 
before Time-2 ratings, and “1” when all IATs were completed before Time-2 ratings.  
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Table 4. Simple slope estimates and standard errors of average simultaneous within-subject effect of IAT 
scores and Time-1 feeling thermometer preferences in the prediction of Time-2 feeling thermometer 
preferences as a function of IAT Score Prediction and IAT Completion (N = 193), Study 2. 
 
 
IATs  
Completed 
No IATs  
Completed 
 
IAT Score 
Prediction 
Thermometer preferences Time-1 .76*** (.041) .74*** (.045) 
IAT scores .23*** (.039) .17*** (.042) 
No IAT 
Score 
Prediction 
Thermometer preferences Time-1 .77*** (.041) .93*** (.042) 
IAT scores .07†      (.039) -.02        (.041) 
Note. †p = .087, ***p < .001. Scores were standardized for each participant before they were entered into 
the multi-level analyses. Values can be interpreted similarly to partial correlation coefficients. 
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Table 5. Feeling thermometer preferences at Time-2 regressed simultaneously onto IAT scores and 
feeling thermometer preferences at Time-1 (Level-1) as a function of IAT score prediction and IAT 
completion (Level-2), Study 3. 
Parameters (DV: Thermometer Ratings Time-2) Slope Estimates  (Standard Errors) 
Fixed effects  
 Thermometer Ratings Time-1 .78 *** (.020) 
 Therm. Time-1*IAT compl. Ctr1 (no-IAT vs. IAT) -.02 (.014) 
 Therm. Time-1*IAT compl. Ctr2 (no fb vs. fb) -.02 (.024) 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction -.09 *** (.020) 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction*IAT compl. Ctr1 -.03 * (.014) 
 Therm. Time-1*Prediction*IAT compl. Ctr2 .02 (.024) 
 IAT Scores .14 *** (.019) 
 IAT Scores*IAT compl. Ctr1 (no-IAT vs. IAT) .04 ** (.014) 
 IAT Scores*IAT compl. Ctr2 (no fb vs. fb) .02 (.023) 
 IAT Scores*Prediction .11 *** (.019) 
 IAT Scores*Prediction* IAT compl. Ctr1 .01 (.014) 
 IAT Scores*Prediction* IAT compl. Ctr2 .01 (.023) 
Random effect variances  
 Thermometer ratings Time-1 .037 *** (.009) 
 IAT scores .034 *** (.009) 
 Residuals .167 *** (.008) 
Goodness of fit  
 -2 log likelihood 1614.16 
Note. All level-1 variables and the dependent IAT scores were standardized for each individual 
participant before they are entered in the analysis. Hence, all individual mean values are 0 and no 
intercept and no Level-1 main effects can be estimated. The prediction manipulation is coded “-1” for no 
predictions and “1” for predictions. The IAT completion manipulation is reflected in two separate 
contrasts. In Contrast-1 (Ctr1), the no-IAT completion condition is coded “-2” while both IAT completion 
conditions are coded “1”; in Contrast 2 (Ctr2), the no-completion condition is coded “0”, the IAT 
completion without feedback conditions is coded “-1”, and the IAT with feedback condition is coded “1”. 
Ctr = Contrast, fb = feedback. 
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Table 6. Simple slope estimates and standard errors of average simultaneous within-subject effects of 
IAT scores and Time-1 feeling thermometer preferences in the prediction of Time-2 feeling thermometer 
preferences as a function of IAT Score Prediction and IAT Completion (N = 243), Study 3. 
 
 
IATs 
Completed 
with feedback 
IATs 
Completed without 
feedback 
No IATs 
Completed 
 
IAT Score 
Prediction 
Thermometer 
preferences Time-1 
.63*** (.047) .63*** (.048) .79*** (.047) 
IAT scores .33*** (.047) .26*** (.046) .16*** (.046) 
No IAT 
Score 
Prediction 
Thermometer 
preferences Time-1 
.84*** (.048) .91*** (.049) .85*** (.049) 
IAT scores .07        (.047) .05       (.048) -.02        (.047) 
 
Note. ***p < .001. Scores were standardized for each participant before they were entered into the multi-
level analyses. Values can be interpreted similarly to partial correlation coefficients.  
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Figure 1. Procedure and design of Study 1: Four between-subjects conditions and one repeated-measures 
factor in a 2 (IAT Score Prediction: prediction vs. no prediction; between-subjects) × 2 (IAT Completion: 
before Time-1 thermometer ratings vs. after Time-2 thermometer ratings; between-subjects) × 2 (Time of 
Feeling Thermometer Ratings: Time-1 vs. Time-2; within-subjects) mixed design. 
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Figure 2. Changes in explicit pro-White bias over Asians, Blacks, and Latinos from Time-1 to Time-2 as 
a function of IAT score prediction and IAT completion, Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors of 
predicted values calculated from a 2 (Time) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 (IAT Completion) × 3 (Target 
Group) ANOVA. 
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Figure 3. Changes in explicit pro-White bias over Asians, Blacks, and Latinos from Time-1 to Time-2 as 
a function of IAT score prediction and IAT completion, Study 2. Error bars represent standard errors of 
predicted values calculated from a 2 (Time) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 2 (IAT Completion) × 3 (Target 
Group) ANOVA.  
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Figure 4. Changes in explicit pro-White bias over Asians, Blacks, and Latinos from Time-1 to Time-2 as 
a function of IAT score prediction and IAT completion, Study 3. Error bars represent standard errors of 
predicted values calculated from a 2 (Time) × 2 (IAT Score Prediction) × 3 (IAT Completion) × 3 (Target 
Group) ANOVA. 
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Figure 5. Acknowledgement of bias as a function of IAT score prediction and IAT completion, Study 4. 
Errors bars depict standard errors of estimated marginal means from a 2 (IAT score prediction vs. no 
prediction) by 2 (IAT completed vs. IATs not completed) ANOVA.  
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Figure 6. Acknowledgement of bias as a function of non-prejudicial goals and IAT score prediction, 
Study 4. Errors bars depict standard errors of estimated marginal means from a regression analysis 
predicting Acknowledgement of bias from IAT score prediction, IAT completion, a z-standardized score 
of Gawronski et al.’s (2008) non-prejudicial goals scale, and all three possible interactions of those 
predictors. 
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Figure 7. Acknowledgement of bias as a function of IAT score predictions and IAT completion, Study 5. 
Errors bars depict standard errors of estimated marginal means from a 2 (IAT score predictions vs. no 
predictions) by 2 (IAT completed w/ feedback vs. IATs completed w/ feedback vs. no IATs completed) 
ANOVA. 
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Figure 8. Acknowledgement of bias as a function of IAT score prediction (Predictions), attention to 
affective reactions (Attention), or completion of a filler task (Control). Study 6. Errors bars depict 
standard errors of estimated marginal means from a one-way ANOVA testing differences between the 
three conditions.  
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Appendix A  
Acknowledgement of Bias Scale used in Studies 4-6 and factor loading on first principal component in 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
 Factor loadings on first principal 
component in PCA 
 Study 4 Study 5 Study 6 
1. I have negative biases against other racial groups. .83 .78 .84 
2. Whether I want it or not, my spontaneous reactions 
towards people are racially biased. 
.91 .90 .94 
3. I have an unintentional racial bias in my first 
reactions towards strangers. 
.86 .79 .82 
4. I show no racial bias in my reactions towards other 
people. (rev.) 
.80 .86 .90 
5. My automatic reactions towards other people are 
racially biased. 
.88 .89 .92 
6. When I observe my own spontaneous reactions when 
meeting strangers, I see no racial bias. (rev.) 
.84 .84 .85 
7. My immediate feelings when I encounter new people 
often show racial biases. 
.83 .85 .89 
8. My first reactions to other people are not influenced 
by their racial background. (rev) 
.84 .86 .85 
% of variance explained by first component in PCA 72.1 71.8 76.6 
Cronbach’s α .95 .94 .96 
 
